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OCTOBER, 1979

THE SOVIET UNION, 1979

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Current History

OCTOBER, 1979

VOL. 77, NO. 450

How secure is the Soviet Union? How has United States recognition of China affected the Soviet-American power balance? Our introductory article, discussing changing Soviet-American relations, underlines the significance of China for the superpowers: "Despite Washington's evidently well-intended assurances of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute . . . and its . . . condemnation of . . . the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, Soviet leaders apparently felt vindicated in their warnings of Chinese aggressiveness. . . . Beijing's mixed success in Vietnam, followed by Chinese withdrawal from most occupied territory, eased a situation perhaps more conducive to the outbreak of general war than any confrontation since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962."

Changing Soviet-American Relations

BY NILS H. WESSELL

Assistant Professor of Government, Lafayette College

WHEN Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, he looked forward to an early summit meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. President Carter was fervently committed to a drastic reduction of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. But he was no less committed, as a matter of personal values and national self-interest, to reestablishing the moral good faith of the United States after Vietnam and Watergate.

In his first year, he hoped to sign a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) and to come to the aid (with whatever pressure rhetoric might exert) of the Soviet Union's beleaguered dissidents. Although he did not want to link cooperation in controlling strategic arms overtly to Soviet restraint in third world conflicts, President Carter intended to press Moscow for agreements across a broad range of outstanding issues, from demilitarizing the Indian Ocean to controlling the arms trade, so that détente (temporarily banished from the Gerald Ford administration's geopolitical primers) might be broadened and deepened. In so doing, President Carter hoped to generate broad public support for what was intended to be a sophisticated resurrection of détente. The administration's two-pronged policy grew out of the belief (advanced by the President's national security adviser, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski) that Soviet-American relations necessarily embodied elements of both conflict and cooperation.

There was every reason to believe that Brezhnev, for his part, was also interested in an early summit

meeting that would provide the occasion for signing what would arguably be the most momentous agreement in history for the control of strategic armaments. From the Soviet standpoint, by the time of Carter's accession to the White House, SALT II had already been delayed for two years by the volatile American political process. The 1976 presidential primaries and general election had frozen President Gerald Ford's will to compromise on the SALT II issues still outstanding after the Vladivostok summit meeting in November, 1974. Other factors reinforced the Soviet sense that time was being frittered away. Brezhnev's uncertain health and personal commitment to détente (however defined) and to SALT (whatever its terms) made the Soviet side eager for rapid progress in Soviet-American relations.

Notwithstanding their mutual impatience, two and one-half years slipped away before the two leaders and their entourages converged on Vienna in June, 1979, almost five years after the last Soviet-American summit. And while President Carter pronounced his satisfaction with the Vienna summit meeting, almost no significant progress was registered on the broad array of issues that bilateral "working groups" had been considering ever since Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's initial trip to Moscow in March, 1977.

At the Vienna summit, a senior White House aide suggested that Brezhnev's poor health and shortened attention span (he is reportedly afflicted with cerebral arteriosclerosis) limited the scope of the talks. While this explanation was undoubtedly true as far as it went, the events of the previous year also contributed

to the vague disappointment that Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) pronounced, in advance, to be tantamount to appeasement.

In the 12 months or so leading to the Vienna summit, Soviet-American relations fluctuated between periods of heightened and diminished tension. Tensions loomed most ominously in the summer of 1978. Human rights violations in the Soviet Union and the Soviet-sponsored intervention of Cuban troops in Africa engendered deep concern in the United States. In his first year in office, President Carter had personally intervened in behalf of persecuted Soviet dissidents. As the costs to the United States of presidential open diplomacy in this sensitive area accumulated, the administration began to exercise greater selectivity. But despite greater caution, President Carter remained committed to a policy of tempering Soviet domestic repression.

In May, 1978, when Yuri Orlov, a physicist and organizer of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, was sentenced to 12 years in prison and internal exile—*itself a flagrant violation of the Helsinki Final Act*—the administration's disappointment was unceasing. Four months of spiraling charges and countercharges ensued. In an unrelated development shortly after Orlov's sentencing, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested two low-ranking Soviet employees of the United Nations Secretariat, Valdik Enger and Rudolf Chernyayev, for espionage. The United States intention to prosecute Enger and Chernyayev evidently offended Moscow, which regarded such a move as a violation of "the rules of the game" according to which the Soviet agents should have been quietly expelled from the country.

While cause and effect were not precisely clear, less than a month passed before the American representative of the International Harvester Corporation in Moscow was arrested by the secret police for alleged "currency violations." As a member of that element of the American business community with the greatest vested interest in expanded economic cooperation under détente, F. Jay Crawford seemed a curious target. No sector of the Soviet economy lags so badly as agriculture and no sector is in greater need of American imports. From the Soviet Union's own standpoint, arresting Crawford seemed to make little sense.

Two weeks later, with the American business community in Moscow still perplexed and nervous, the Soviet Union shifted its attention to the foreign press. Craig Whitney of *The New York Times* and Harold Piper of *The Baltimore Sun* were accused of libeling the good name of Soviet television. Their real offense was reporting on the most sensitive of all political subjects, the troubled relations between Soviet nationalities.

The mounting pressure against "alien influences" heightened still further in early July when Anatoly

Shcharansky, long under detention, was tried and convicted of treason, espionage and anti-Soviet agitation, after President Carter's public assurance that the human rights activist had no relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Ironically, Shcharansky's "crime" was to have disclosed to a Western newsman the names of dissidents and the defense-related factories where they worked, although Moscow had told the United States that these same factories were civilian so they could qualify for United States technology imports. At the same time, Shcharansky's colleague in the dissident movement, Aleksandr Ginzburg, was sentenced to eight years in a labor camp for "anti-Soviet agitation." Meanwhile, the accused American correspondents were convicted of libel.

Notwithstanding the fluctuations in Western news coverage, the Soviet apparatus of repression continued. The summer of 1978 was unusual because of the interaction between Soviet police repression and Soviet-American relations. The latest repression came in the face of public and private American warnings against human rights violations and followed closely on the conclusion of the Belgrade review conference on implementing the human rights and other provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The Carter administration reacted sharply to renewed incidents of repression. The President announced his intention to review the bilateral exchange programs, which Moscow values both for their prestige and for the access they provide Soviet scientists to American scientific and technological developments. Planned visits to Moscow of high-level officials, including presidential science adviser Frank Press, were aborted. President Carter also canceled the scheduled sale of a sophisticated Sperry Rand computer to Tass, the Soviet press agency, and imposed new limits on the export of oil drilling technology, which Moscow sought in order to relieve a squeeze on its oil supply in the 1980's.

For reasons that may well have been related to the administration's determination to back up its human rights rhetoric with action, the Soviet campaign of repression began to ease by the autumn. The Soviet court dealt relatively leniently with Whitney and Piper. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) won assurances on a visit to Moscow that several Soviet families seeking to emigrate would receive exit visas. Jewish emigration was allowed to rise to the highest level in recent years, and Crawford was given a suspended sentence and allowed to return to the United States. As the thaw proceeded, the administration approved the export of oil equipment to the Soviet Union, including the sales blocked in the summer. Most important, after some highly publicized soul-searching, the administration decided to go ahead with the SALT talks without even a symbolic interruption. At the height of tensions over human

rights in mid-July, 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proceeded to Geneva for his scheduled meeting on SALT II with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

If the administration ever intended to link progress on SALT to acceptable Soviet policies on other issues, the summer of 1978 offered the opportunity. Throughout the late winter and early spring, the United States made known its irritation over Soviet policy in Africa, including the presence of a Soviet general and the use of Cuban proxies in Ethiopia's war against Somalia. President Carter and national security adviser Brzezinski warned repeatedly that Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa threatened détente directly and indirectly by undermining public and congressional support for measures like the prospective SALT II. Pro-Soviet coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen were followed by a growing Soviet and East European presence in those countries. In May, Katangan rebels invaded Zaire from neighboring Angola, prompting President Carter to charge Cuba with complicity and leading the United States to provide air transport to assist Belgian and French paratroops to repel the invasion.

Major addresses by President Carter expressed impatience with Soviet policies. At Wake Forest University in March, the President detailed the Soviet military buildup over nearly two decades (discounting inflation, the Soviet military budget has doubled since 1960 while the United States defense budget has actually declined). The President asserted that the United States could match Soviet military power if SALT II were not signed. In June, at Annapolis, he issued a stern warning: "The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice."

However, this blunt admonition lost its sting as a result of repeated administration assurances to Moscow (and to the American arms control community) that the signing of SALT II would not be contingent on Soviet restraint either at home or abroad. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Carter administration's bumbling confusion in deferring production of the neutron bomb (whatever the merits of the decision), the Soviet Union might well have declined to take American warnings seriously. One event that may have given some pause to Moscow was Brzezinski's successful visit to Beijing in May, a reminder of United States diplomatic flexibility.

Despite adventurism in Africa, Soviet foreign policy in these months did not aim exclusively to seize unilateral advantage at American expense. The Warsaw Pact submitted a new conciliatory proposal to the West at the long-stalled Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Moscow thereby accepted several crucial aspects of NATO's position, in particular the principle of equal ceilings for both sides in

Central Europe. Agreement was thwarted primarily by the East's insistence that 130,000 ground troops (mainly Soviet forces in Poland) identified by NATO intelligence did not exist. Although little further advance was made on MBFR in 1978, the Warsaw Pact's movement in the negotiations, together with gradual progress at SALT, a respite in Moscow's show trials of dissidents, and a reduction of sorts in Soviet-Cuban activity in Africa combined toward the end of the year to reduce the level of tension in Soviet-American relations. Not that a great deal of positive momentum had built up. The Soviet Union was annoyed at its exclusion from the Mideast peace process as American diplomacy forged a peace accord between Israel and Egypt. The United States, for its part, was irritated by vocal Soviet support for opponents of the Shah of Iran, by Moscow's allegations of Central Intelligence Agency plotting to keep the Shah in power, and by Brezhnev's warning against United States interference.

SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE

Soviet-American trade was another area of détente showing decidedly mixed results in 1978. On the surface, the aggregate trade figure of \$2.8-billion worth of goods was a record high. But Soviet trade with West Germany, at \$6.5 billion, dwarfed this level of economic exchange. The other main competitor of the United States in world trade, Japan, rang up \$3.9-billion worth of business with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the composition of Soviet-American trade showed the preponderance of the grain trade. American agricultural exports amounted to \$1.7 billion, accounting for three-fourths of all American exports to Russia. A tribute to the American farmer and something less to collectivized Soviet agriculture, this figure—a 70 percent increase over 1977—was paralleled by a sharp drop in the industrial sector. In 1978, Moscow cut its purchases of American industrial equipment to less than \$500 million, less than half the 1976 figure.

To whet the appetites of American businessmen and bankers, Moscow attributed the decline in industrial imports to the United States Trade Act of 1974, which (in the form of the so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment) denied the Soviet Union most-favored nation (MFN) status so long as it pursued repressive emigration policies. A second amendment, the Stevenson amendment, imposed strict limits on the amount of government credit and credit guarantees that could be extended to the Soviet Union. Export-Import Bank credits for the development of Soviet natural gas and oil were also sharply restricted.

Most economists who have studied the MFN issue believe that the extension of normal tariffs would have a minimal impact in boosting Soviet exports to the United States, since most Soviet exports are raw

materials now subject to relatively low duties. But since rejecting the bilateral trade agreement with the United States in early 1975, Soviet leaders have consistently maintained that they (not the Jewish dissidents) were victims of discrimination and that, if only for symbolic reasons, non-discriminatory tariffs would have to be provided before they would buy in the United States. This political consideration aside, the \$300-million limit on credits posed the greatest obstacle to economic cooperation, because Soviet hard currency reserves could not support the mammoth scale of projects under consideration. In the fall of 1978, another obstacle was added when the White House decided to monitor high-technology exports to Communist countries more closely. In the future, the National Security Council and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy were to act as "observers" in all export license requests for technology to Communist states.

As 1978 drew to a close, a final factor of uncertainty was injected into this extremely fluid situation—American recognition of the People's Republic of China. In November, the Soviet Union had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Vietnam. One month later, a full-scale Vietnamese invasion was mounted against Cambodia (Kampuchea) and Hanoi announced the creation of a Cambodian United Front aimed at overthrowing the pro-Chinese regime of Pol Pot, which had conducted a campaign of genocide against millions of its own people. (Brzezinski's earlier characterization of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border conflict as a "proxy war" between Moscow and Beijing appeared amply vindicated.)

Against the backdrop of Soviet willingness to exploit tensions in third world areas like Southeast Asia and the "arc of crisis" from Ethiopia to Afghanistan, the administration reminded Moscow that efforts to extract unilateral advantage at United States expense might spark a basic diplomatic realignment. Japan, repeatedly rebuffed by Moscow on the reversion of the Hokkaido offshore islands, had already (in August) signed a treaty of peace and friendship with China containing the "anti-hegemony" clause anathema to Moscow. In mid-December, President Carter announced unexpectedly that the United States was granting full diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.

Moscow was alarmed, less by full United States recognition of China than by the prospect that a *de facto* Sino-American alliance was in the making. Plans for Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to visit

Washington, and American approval of British and French plans to sell arms to Beijing deeply upset the Kremlin despite the fact that the United States continued to refuse to sell its own arms to China. Moscow's most influential American expert, Georgy Arbatov, warned that

if China becomes some sort of military ally of the West, even an informal ally . . . we would have to reexamine our relationship with the West. . . . Then there would be no place for détente.¹

Although Soviet expressions of apprehension confirmed that improved Sino-American relations might exert leverage on the U.S.S.R., the immediate response of the Soviet leadership was to raise a series of dead issues at the SALT talks, as if to prove their immunity from pressure. Even in advance of China's retaliatory invasion of Vietnam, William Hyland, former senior staff member of the National Security Council, observed:

This is a watershed period in our ties with the U.S.S.R. The next months or year will be very critical. With China's moves west, the U.S. normalization with Beijing, the possibility of Western arms sales to the Chinese, and developments in SALT, all the major actors are in motion. We have to be very careful.²

China's invasion of Vietnam on the heels of Deng's visit to the United States and his threat (while here) to teach Hanoi "a lesson" must have seemed in Moscow to represent the realization of its fears. Despite Washington's evidently well-intended assurances of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and its balanced condemnation of both the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, Soviet leaders apparently felt vindicated in their warnings of Chinese aggressiveness even while they implied publicly that collusion had led to the Chinese incursion. Beijing's mixed success in Vietnam, followed by Chinese withdrawal from most occupied territories, eased a situation perhaps more conducive to the outbreak of general war than any confrontation since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Surviving these vicissitudes were the SALT negotiations, which despite ups and downs and occasional delays, were too valuable to both sides and too near completion to be scuttled. Nonetheless, as the June Soviet-American summit meeting approached, it be-

(Continued on page 132)

¹Interview with Jonathan Power, *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), November 11-12, 1978, as quoted by Adam Ulam, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Co-existence," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1978* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations), p. 566.

²*Time*, January 22, 1979.

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"The chances that the arms race might be turned around do not seem high, but the opportunities to achieve this end in the first half of the 1980's may be unparalleled. SALT II, managed with persistence and statesmanship, may support the transformation of political and economic priorities in the United States and the Soviet Union."

SALT II and the Strategic Relationship

BY LAWRENCE T. CALDWELL

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PRESIDENT Jimmy Carter signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) on June 18, 1979, along with Soviet President (and General Secretary of the Communist party) Leonid Brezhnev.¹ Despite the trappings of a historic moment, the ceremonies in Vienna seemed vaguely out of focus. The gilded Redoutensaal of the Hofburg Palace evoked Beethoven conducting his Seventh Symphony before the monarchs of Europe at the Vienna Congress of 1815. In 1979, however, the palace witnessed history's most complicated legal effort to come to grips with the modern technology of war in a treaty signed by two somber Presidents dressed in the dark suits preferred by bureaucrats in Moscow and Washington alike. This summit should have been a high moment in United States foreign policy. The administration's substantive achievement reflected its characteristic attention to detail, its hard work and its tenacious pursuit of the security goals set by the President.

Still, this occasion seemed oddly undervalued, and President Carter returned from Vienna to face a growing economic crisis and declining popularity. Within days of his return, he left again for Tokyo and an economic summit with the leaders of other industrialized nations. In Tokyo, while the leaders of the European Community, the United States and Japan were meeting, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries raised its base price for oil once again, thereby seizing center stage and symbolizing both the shift of international power away from an East-West to a North-South axis and the shift in American foreign policy from military security to economic security.

The Vienna summit, then, quickly faded from public view. There were other reasons the occasion

*Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.).

¹The U.S. State Department has published a very useful collection of the documents and analysis: *SALT II Agreement*, Selected Documents No. 12A, Washington, D.C., Department of State, 1979, no. 8984).

²92nd Congress, Public Law 92-448, Joint Resolution 1227, September 30, 1972, in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT, The Moscow Agreements and Beyond* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 314-315.

seemed slightly out of focus. Because of Brezhnev's ill health, the meeting took place in Europe, although protocol suggested that it was the Soviet leader's turn to come to the United States. While there was no evidence of dissent within the Kremlin leadership over SALT II, American analysts were acutely aware that a succession crisis in Soviet leadership might soon alter the political context within which the treaty operated. In the United States, the debate over ratification had already begun; it promised to be sharp and to range over a wide variety of issues in Soviet-American relations.

This blurred view of the lengthy negotiations, however, did not diminish the effects of the treaty and its associated documents for the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The SALT II agreements, far more detailed than any previous arms control measure, consist of several interrelated parts:

The Treaty itself, with 19 articles, 46 "agreed statements," and 42 "common understandings."

A Protocol, with 4 articles, 4 "agreed statements," and 5 "common understandings."

A "Memorandum of Understanding" that establishes a "data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms" and is accompanied by unilateral statements on the numbers by each side.

A Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.

By combining these documents, the two powers achieved several things never previously settled between them. First, the Soviets provided their own numbers for strategic weapons and named their own weapons systems publicly for the first time. In fact, Soviet representatives had conducted secret negotiations with their American counterparts on the basis of United States data until, in the mid-1970's, the habits of détente apparently reduced their traditional reluctance about security in military matters. Second, these agreements were based on numerical equality in strategic weapons, a condition mandated by the Jackson Amendment* to the Joint Resolution of Congress approving the Interim Agreement (SALT I) in 1972.²

Numerical equality reflected joint recognition of Soviet technological advances. Third, while the agreements could not satisfy anyone who insists on 100 percent security for the United States and 100 percent verifiability for arms control, they were the most precisely worded and most carefully negotiated of any agreements in modern history.

ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY

SALT II has been plagued by a double handicap. First, the negotiations have been made to carry far too heavy a political burden. Three American administrations have attempted to link Soviet-American interest in arms limitations with other conflicting interests. During the Middle East October War in 1973, Angola and the Portuguese revolution in 1974-1975, and the "Eurocommunism" scares of 1975-1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned, often implicitly and sometimes explicitly, that cooperation with the Soviets in such matters as strategic arms limitation and trade was fundamentally incompatible with the lack of restraint he perceived in Soviet behavior outside the bilateral relationship.³

Possibly influenced by national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter also tried to link cooperation and conflict in an effort to influence Soviet policy. His speech at Wake Forest in March, 1978, represented the most direct articulation of his policy of linkage, but he resorted to the tactic when the going got tough in the Horn of Africa as well.⁴ SALT II's second handicap often interacted symbiotically with linkage. When the Soviet Union emerged as a global military superpower during the 1970's, Americans of widely different political persuasions attempted to wish that fact away. SALT II was sometimes regarded as a means of preserving American military advantage by mutual agreement or of correcting imbalances that Congress and three administrations were unwilling to correct. It is, of course, improbable that the Soviet Union would agree to arms limitations that alleviated American military difficulties.

Whatever its achievements, SALT II neither re-

³For a recent statement of Kissinger's position, see his exchange with Senator John C. Culver during his testimony on the SALT II accords, as reported in the *Los Angeles Times*, August 3, 1979, p. 22. Excerpts from his testimony can be found in *The New York Times*, August 1, 1979, pp. 1, 6. On his earlier use of linkage policy, see for example his December 23, 1975, news conference. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 7 and his news conference before his trip to Moscow the next month. *Ibid.*, January 15, 1976, pp. 1, 8.

⁴*The New York Times*, March 18, 1978, pp. 1, 14. The most direct statements of the Africa linkage came from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in the spring of 1978. See reports of his impromptu session with reporters on March 1, 1978, *Los Angeles Times*, March 2, 1978, p. 1, and of his appearance on "Meet The Press," on May 28, 1978, *The New York Times*, May 29, 1978, pp. 1, 4.

duces defense budgets, nor secures American military superiority, nor eliminates political conflict between the superpowers. However, it provides four kinds of control over the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, and may reduce tensions between them and enable political leadership on both sides to exercise military restraint.

QUANTITATIVE RESTRAINTS

SALT II provides an aggregate ceiling for strategic weapons—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), heavy bombers and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBM's) launched from them. This ceiling is placed at 2,400 delivery vehicles immediately on entry into force of the treaty, and pledges the parties to reduce that ceiling from 2,400 to 2,250 between January 1 and December 31, 1981. (Article III: paragraphs 1 and 2, Article XI: paragraphs 1-4.)

Article V of the treaty sets a subceiling of 1,320 on all ICBM's, SLBM's, and ASBM's equipped with multiple-independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's), and bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's) whose range exceeds 600 kilometers. The MIRV limit is further restricted to 1,200 on ICBM's, SLBM's, and ASBM's, leaving the option that 120 bombers might be equipped with ALCM's in addition to the MIRV subceiling. Finally, Article V stipulates that only 820 of those delivery vehicles counted toward the MIRV subceiling may be placed on ICBM's.

While these numbers are high, the restrictions have important consequences. The treaty does not attempt to go beyond these limits in controlling the mix of strategic weapons on each side; on the contrary, it explicitly reserves for each "the right to determine the composition of these aggregates." Still, the subceiling on MIRVed ICBM's, for example, places a definite cap on the number of SS-X-18 and 19 missiles (those most worrisome to American strategic planners) the Soviets are likely to deploy. Similarly, the aggregate ceilings of 1,320 for all MIRV's and ALCM's with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers means that every long-range cruise missile beyond 120 will be deployed by the United States at the sacrifice of another kind of MIRV delivery vehicle. These provisions give the Soviets some control over American programs to deploy cruise missiles, an issue that threatened the negotiations as early as the spring of 1975.

QUALITATIVE RESTRAINTS

Quantitative measures of strategic military capability are important, but the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has increasingly shifted to qualitative measures—technological developments along a broad spectrum from command and control to the accuracy of guidance systems to

GLOSSARY OF SALT TERMS*

STRATEGIC WEAPONS: used in this article to denote offensive weapons in the inventories of the U.S. or U.S.S.R. capable of reaching the territory of one power from launchers of the other.

ICBM's: intercontinental ballistic missiles. A land-based ballistic missile with a range of 5,500 km (about 3,000 miles) or more. The U.S. has the Titan II (54), Minuteman II (450), and Minuteman III (550). The U.S.S.R. has the SS-9 (c. 100), the SS-11 (740), the SS-13 (60), the SS-17 (70), the SS-18 (200) and the SS-19 (230).

SLBM's: submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile carried in and fired from submarines. The U.S. has the Polaris A3 (160) and the Poseidon C3 (496). It is about to begin deployment of the Trident C4. The U.S.S.R. has the SS-N-6 (528), the SS-N-8 (370), the SS-N-18 (32), the SS-NX-17 (12) and a few older missiles as well.

ASBM's: air-to-surface ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile launched from an airplane against a target more than 600 kilometers away. Neither side has yet deployed this weapon, although it comes under the provisions of the treaty.

CM's: cruise missiles. A guided missile using the characteristics of aircraft for flight within the atmosphere. They can

be launched from planes (ALCM's), sea-launched (SLCM's) or ground-launched (GLCM's).

MIRV's: multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle. Multiple reentry vehicles (RV's) carried by a ballistic missile, each of which can be directed to separate targets along unrelated trajectories. Such RV's are placed on a postboost vehicle (PBV) for dispensing and targeting them.

"HEAVY" ICBM's: the Soviet SS-9's and SS-18's.

"LIGHT" ICBM's: all other ICBM's—the heaviest of which is the Soviet SS-19.

LAUNCH WEIGHT: the weight of a fully loaded missile at the time of launch, including PBV and accompanying RV's.

THROW WEIGHT: the weight of the military components of a missile placed on its trajectory by the boost stages of the missile, i.e., the RV's, PBV's and any penetration aids.

FIRST STRIKE: an initial nuclear attack.

SECOND STRIKE: a response with nuclear weapons after absorbing a first strike.

COUNTERFORCE: a nuclear strike against an opponent's military targets, as opposed to civilian targets (countervalue strike).

*Numbers in parentheses are the author's estimates based on public data for June, 1979.

miniaturization of reentry vehicle (RV) components. Probably the most serious technological development in the past decade has been the coupling of large increases in the number of warheads with steadily improving accuracy. The conjunction of these developments led to a change in American targeting strategy in 1973-1974, with the adoption of the "Schlesinger Doctrine."⁵ This development shifted the targeting of some American missiles to a counterforce second-strike mode—i.e., after absorbing a Soviet first strike, the United States would retain the option of attacking the remaining Soviet missiles in an effort to limit damage in any subsequent exchange between the superpowers. The Schlesinger Doctrine would upgrade the credibility of American deterrence by providing American political leadership with an alternative other than simple retaliation against Soviet cities in the event that Moscow struck first but withheld some of its own missiles to hold United States cities "hostage" against American retaliation. It depended, in essence, on the wedding of MIRVed Minuteman III missiles with guidance systems so accurate that each warhead had a high probability of "killing" Soviet missile silos. In a reasonable parallel, a few skeptics in the United States debate over SALT II argued that Soviet acquisition of increased accuracy for their guidance systems (especially for the powerful and MIRVed SS-18's and 19's) in the early 1980's would give Soviet strategic forces a "window of opportunity," by which they would enjoy some probabil-

ity of making a successful and disarming counterforce first strike against American land-based missiles.

Both the Schlesinger Doctrine and the alleged "window of opportunity" point toward a dilemma in contemporary strategy that originates in technological developments. Coupling accurate MIRV's to ICBM's increases the credibility of deterrence by providing that even the survival of a few ICBM's after a first strike can inflict disproportionately larger damage in a retaliatory second strike. This development might be thought to improve stability. However, missile forces usable in a counterforce second strike are virtually indistinguishable from those usable in a first strike, and most analysts agree that credible first-strike forces reduce stability. If either side were able to deploy accurate warheads in such numbers that a small percentage of its missile force might be employed in a successful first strike against the opponent's missiles, that opponent's deterrence might be substantially eroded. For example, if the Soviets should deploy 300 SS-18's, each with 10 warheads (the maximum number with which it has been tested) of sufficient accuracy to achieve a 50 percent probability of destroying a Minuteman silo, United States strategic planners would have to assume that the 1,000 American ICBM's were rendered functionally useless as a second-strike weapon (3,000 warheads aboard the SS-18's could destroy 1,500 hard targets if the 50 percent probability of kill represented an accurate assumption).

Hence it has been a primary function of SALT II to reduce the uncertainties associated with the technological wedding of increased numbers of warheads with improved silo-busting accuracy. In the first

⁵The first careful enunciation of the "Schlesinger Doctrine" is found in Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report*, FY 1975, March 4, 1974 (Washington, D.C., 1974), pp. 4-5.

instance, this necessitates controls over the ratio between missiles and warheads. SALT II attacks the problem with aggregate ceilings (1,200 MIRVed ICBM's, SLBM's and ASBM's in Article V: paragraphs 1-3) and with specific warhead limits. Article IV (paragraphs 10-14) provides that neither party will flight-test or deploy ICBM's, SLBM's or ASBM's with more warheads than those already tested by May 1, 1979—10, 14 and 10, respectively. The first agreed statement for paragraph 12 of Article IV also lists the MIRVed missiles in each side's inventory and specifies the maximum number of warheads with which each has been tested. Article IV makes the maximum number of warheads tested by either party the ceiling for both parties in each category of missile.

This kind of provision has come under criticism from those who believe the treaty sanctions the arms race and those who believe it provides a cover under which the Soviet Union can continue its strategic buildup while lulling the American public into a false sense of security.⁶ However, Article III establishes a maxima for numbers of warheads in each category, and thereby reduces the uncertainties attendant on either side achieving a breakthrough in the warhead to missile ratio. This possibility has long been a nightmare of American analysts, who have observed that the launch and throw-weights of the SS-18's and 19's exceed any missile in the United States arsenal and who fear that once the Soviet side has improved its accuracy and payload miniaturization techniques it may couple those missiles with very large numbers of warheads.

The limits on aggregate MIRV's and on numbers of warheads per missile contained in Articles IV and V do not address another difficulty associated with qualitative competition. Since each side is free to choose its mix of strategic weapons, within aggregate ceilings, either side might elect to maximize its number of warheads by deploying those missiles with the largest payloads. The controversy which arose in SALT I over the definition of "heavy" missiles was inspired by precisely this option. Article IV limits the substitution of technologically more advanced missiles for less advanced ones. Paragraph 3 prohibits the conversion of launchers for "light" ICBM's to those capable of launching "heavy" ICBM's. While modernization can go on within the aggregate ceilings, no

missile launcher deployed before 1964 or deployed with a single warhead, including the SS-9, may be converted to a newer, MIRVed launcher unless it is counted against the MIRV ceilings of Article V; and none of the early Soviet ICBM's (SS-9's, 11's, and 13's) can be converted to the SS-18's (heavy) ICBM launchers. (Article IV: paragraph 3, and Article VI: paragraph 3.) Article IV also places definite limits on silo modernization (no more than 32 percent in volume).

Paragraph 9 of Article IV drew the most attention in the early stages of Senate hearings on the treaty. It permits each side to "deploy one new type of light ICBM." In a sense, this controversy is ironic because the provision primarily reflects the United States effort to deploy the MX, but paragraph 9 carries the burden of preventing the Soviets from continuing to modernize their forces at the rate they have achieved since the Interim Agreement was signed in 1972. The first agreed statement accompanying paragraph 9 of Article IV states that "new" ICBM's are those that are "different from those . . . flight-tested as of May 1, 1979," according to a number of characteristics. The first common understanding of that same paragraph restricts any changes in missiles tested prior to May 1, 1979, to a maximum of 5 percent in length, diameter, launch-weight and throw-weight.

Finally, the agreed statements and common understandings of paragraphs 9 through 11 of Article IV specify a number of characteristics of new ICBM's and MIRV's that are precluded—including testing parameters of the new missile, procedures for "releasing or dispensing" warheads from RV's tested before May 1, 1979, and even limits on reducing the weight of reentry vehicles of missiles tested prior to that date. All of these provisions are intended to prevent the development of new technology that would upset the assumptions of SALT II.

Thus, while SALT II does not preclude all dimensions of qualitative technological development that might affect the strategic balance, it goes much further in that respect than any previous arms control agreement. It is doubtful that either side could gain sufficient advantage by stretching the qualitative limits of the SALT II framework to justify the risks of discovery and the consequent sacrifice of the treaty advantages.

VERIFICATION

No other issue drew so much public attention during the spring and early summer of 1979 as the contention that the SALT II agreements were not verifiable. The issue was complicated, and public confusion grew when President Carter, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of Defense provided different assessments of the problem.⁷ The immediate question was whether "listen-

⁶See for example the criticisms of Paul H. Nitze and General Edward J. Rowley before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *The New York Times*, July 13, 1979, p. 4, and those of General Alexander Haig, *ibid.*, July 27, 1979, pp. 1, 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, have indicated their reservation that the treaty must be accompanied by a determined effort to increase the strategic defense effort. *Ibid.*, July 12, 1979, pp. 1, 4 and July 25, p. 3.

⁷The verification issue broke on April 17th with the leak of testimony by CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner who had briefed a Senate Appropriations subcommittee the

ing” stations in Iran, lost to the United States after the overthrow of the Shah, were essential for verification of the treaty and its attendant accords. On the whole, however, this was a phony issue. The real question was whether Soviet strategic behavior would be easier to monitor within the terms of the agreements or without them. To that question a simple answer was possible. A number of provisions in the treaty facilitate verification without, of course, guaranteeing 100 percent certainty that either side complies with its provisions.

Article II defines ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers including the characteristics of strategic cruise missiles, ASBM's and MIRV's. It specifies which missiles are “heavy” and which are “light,” including specific reference to systems on both sides. In fact, the listing of particular Soviet and American missiles and planes and the definition of some of their principal characteristics—including numbers of MIRV's for each missile or ASBM characteristics for the bombers—constitute a real breakthrough in international agreements between the superpowers.

a) FROD's. The agreements provide a new term in the vocabulary of arms control—functionally related observable differences (FROD's). The second common understanding of paragraph 3 in Article II requires that the Soviet Union must equip its Myasishchev (Bison) bombers (used for refueling) with FROD's that will demonstrate indisputably that they cannot be used as bombers. Similarly, the fifth agreed statement to that paragraph designates the Tupolev 142 as an antisubmarine airplane and not as a bomber, based on FROD's, and the fourth agreed statement makes FROD's the key variable in defining “heavy bombers.”

week before, *The New York Times*, April 17, 1979, p. 1. He apparently claimed that it would take five years to replace the monitoring capabilities lost in Iran because of the revolution there. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown issued a statement that same day saying that it would take about a year to regain the ability to verify the arms pact adequately and that it would take the Soviets longer than that to violate the accords. *The New York Times*, April 18, 1979, pp. 1, 7. Eventually Carter himself had to enter the controversy in speeches to the National Academy of Sciences on April 23, *Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 1979, p. 5, and to the American Newspaper Publishers Association on April 25. *Ibid.*, April 26, 1979, p. 12. There was a slightly bizarre twist to the story when Deng Xiaoping offered to install U.S. monitoring equipment on Chinese soil. *Ibid.*, April 20, 1979, pp. 1, 8.

⁸On the question of the cruise missile controversy, see *The New York Times*, June 16, 1975, pp. 1, 16, and the coverage of the Ford/Brezhnev meeting in Helsinki that August. *Washington Post*, August 3, 1975, pp. 1, 15, 16. See Kissinger's comments before and after his trip to Moscow. *The New York Times*, January 16, 1976, pp. 1, 5, and January 24, 1976, pp. 1, 8. On the bureaucratic struggle, see *ibid.*, February 17, 1976, p. 8.

b) EOD's. Two technological problems proved especially worrisome during the long SALT II negotiations. A year after President Gerald Ford went to Vladivostok in November, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger returned from a trip to Moscow in January, 1976, with the apparent belief that the two sides were reasonably close to completing the treaty.⁸ However, the issue of whether the cruise missile would be included in the treaty sharpened into a tough bureaucratic struggle along the Potomac, and the Russians apparently hardened their insistence that this technology should come under treaty provisions.

From 1975 to the signing of the treaty, cruise missiles remained an issue. Both sides settled early on the compromise: aircraft equipped to launch cruise missiles (ALCM's) with a range of more than 600 kilometers would be counted against the MIRV sub-ceiling; in any case, the United States did not plan to deploy ground-launched (GLCM's) and sea-launched (SLCM's) cruise missiles until the 1980's. Once there was a device for creating a protocol—into which controversial items would be placed for a period of time shorter than the duration of the formal treaty, the political problem of the cruise missile could be solved. But the technical problem remained. How could either side be certain that a cruise missile had a range of less than 600 kilometers?

The answer was that each side agreed to build missiles capable only of ranges less than 600 kilometers with “externally observable design features” that would distinguish them from those with longer range capabilities. (Article II: paragraph 8, second common understanding.) The same restriction, based on EOD's, was placed on GLCM's and SLCM's in the Protocol. (Article II: paragraph 3, second common understanding.) The principle was also applied to MIRV's: ICBM and SLBM launchers capable of firing missiles with multiple warheads must be distinguished from those not capable of doing so by “externally observable design features.” (Article II: paragraph 5, fifth common understanding.)

The SALT II agreements, then, represent a real advance in Soviet-American relations in the sense that both sides agree that it is in their mutual interests for each power to design weapons systems in a manner that facilitates the other's capacity to monitor their functions. Articles VI and VII of the treaty are further designed to facilitate verification by proscribing cer-

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"The Soviet Union has yet to acquire direct and firm influence over any country in the Middle East; nevertheless, over the past generation its policy has skillfully exploited Western ineptness and regional conflicts and has effected a major change in the overall strategic environment within which Soviet diplomacy seeks to advance tangible Soviet aims."

The Soviet Union in the Middle East

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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RECENT Soviet policy in the Middle East has not been notable for its imagination or initiative, but it has had many successes. The improved Soviet position in the area in the past year derives from the consequences of United States policy and regional upheavals that have redounded to the immediate Soviet advantage. Inadvertence rather than design brought Moscow quick dividends.

Moscow's opposition to Washington's efforts to bring about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was rooted in the consequences of the October War. When the cease-fire took effect in October, 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat jolted the Kremlin by restoring diplomatic relations with the United States. Though Moscow had saved Egypt from another possible defeat, Sadat plumped Egypt's eggs into Washington's basket, leaving the Soviets empty-handed, angry, and odd men out in the Arab world.

The combination of Sadat's preference and United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's diplomacy made Washington the hub of efforts to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement and relegated Moscow to the sidelines. Kissinger fashioned two disengagement agreements on the Egyptian-Israeli front and an important first-stage pullback in the Syrian-Israeli sector. However, by late 1976, he seemed to have run out of new steps, and prospects for a settlement appeared remote. In the meantime, Moscow had been active in finding a role and a constituency for itself: it built up Syria's military capability, sold massive amounts of arms to Iraq and Libya, and followed the lead of the Arab rejectionist front in espousing the maximalist demands of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

In January, 1977, President Jimmy Carter took office determined to press for a comprehensive Middle East settlement. Deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union over human rights and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) prompted Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to explore the possibility of United States-Soviet cooperation on the Arab-Israeli problem, in the hope that progress on a Middle East settlement would have a salutary effect on the nego-

tiations in other sectors. Moreover, when Menachem Begin became the Israeli Prime Minister in June, 1977, influential members of the Carter administration felt that no further progress toward a Middle East settlement was possible without Soviet participation.

On October 1, 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement calling for a return to Geneva. Subsequent Israeli opposition and American indecisiveness led Sadat to take matters into his own hands. The result was his historic visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977. This revised step-by-step diplomacy forestalled a return to Geneva, and kept the Soviet Union outside the bargaining process.

Moscow denounced Sadat's initiative as "an act of capitulation" and strongly supported the position of the hard-line Arab states—Syria, Iraq, Libya and Algeria—who sought to prevent any Egyptian-Israeli agreement. It also bitterly criticized the United States for reneging on the joint statement and encouraging an Egyptian-Israeli agreement at the expense of Arab unity.

During the months that followed, Moscow watched the ups-and-downs of the Egyptian-Israeli talks and Washington's inability to bring matters to a conclusion. By the end of July, 1978, the Soviet Union had reason to expect an American failure. Then came the August 8 announcement in Washington of a meeting to be convened on September 5, 1978, at Camp David, Maryland. President Carter's personal commitment and involvement made the difference.

The Soviet leadership reacted with predictable hostility to the two agreements reached between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. First, Moscow said the agreements signaled Sadat's surrender. Because he agreed to sign a separate treaty with Israel before assuring the Palestinians of their rights, Sadat was accused of giving in to American pressure. Second, Moscow insisted that the failure to mention the PLO would make the situation more explosive. Third, Moscow cautioned against the introduction of United States troops or bases in Sinai or on the West Bank. Finally, Moscow criticized the Camp David accords

as indicative of an inherent anti-Soviet bias.

Any agreement on the Middle East made without Soviet participation is considered anti-Soviet by Moscow and devoid of political realism. Time and again, Soviet officials have insisted that a conflict as extensive and explosive as that between the Arab states and Israel cannot be settled without the cooperation of the Soviet Union. They claim that what happens in the Middle East is a matter of vital national interest to the U.S.S.R.; that Soviet strategic concerns encompass the entire Middle East and not merely the areas bordering on the Soviet Union. Moreover, in private, some Soviet officials make the point that they "will not be pushed around by the United States."

The Soviet Union wants to be treated as an equal of the United States, but it remains hamstrung by its tactical blunder in breaking diplomatic relations with Israel in June, 1967, and by the residual suspicion with which it is viewed by all the Arab states. Very often, in pursuit of Soviet interests, Moscow seems more a client of the Arab confrontation states than a superpower in control of its own basic policy moves.

With the formal signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979, Arab opposition consolidated and spread. The polarization of the Arab world between pro-Sadat and anti-Sadat forces serves Soviet ends. Moscow denounced the treaty and upholds the Arab rejectionist position, ingratiating itself to the coalition of extremist and moderate Arab leaders, who are increasingly pursuing policies detrimental to United States interests.

Though opposed to the treaty, Moscow may well be a prime beneficiary. In terms of the Soviet position in the Arab world, the treaty helps Moscow in various ways. It crystallizes Arab opposition to Sadat, whose anti-Soviet attitude cost Moscow its previous commanding position in Egypt; it creates a new polarization in the Arab world, with the United States seen as Egypt's patron and the Soviet Union as siding with most Arab states; it intensifies Arab militancy and reinforces the importance of the Soviet connection for the Arab rejectionist group; it may help break down some of the residual suspicion of Moscow felt by countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and it puts United States policy under great pressure everywhere in the area.

There is little evidence that the Soviet Union has any genuine interest in a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, which would severely diminish Moscow's attractiveness to Arab states as a supplier of arms and a shield against military defeat. It is obvious that Moscow has its own interests in the Middle East and that it will pursue them, whether or not it takes part in the settlement process. For example, during the Middle East crises of 1967, 1969-70, 1973, 1974-1975, and 1977, some American officials reported that the Soviets were trying to be "helpful." Yet, when one

probes to find out precisely how Moscow was helping, one is left with an ambiguity. Thus, during the flareup of the Lebanese civil war in early October, 1978, President Jimmy Carter used the "hot line" to enlist Soviet party President Leonid Brezhnev's assistance to help preserve the precarious cease-fire. Moscow apparently counseled the Syrians to exercise restraint. But the key element was Syrian President Hafez Assad, who did not require any Soviet reminder of the critical nature of the crisis or of Israel's vital interest in seeing that the Lebanese Christian forces were not destroyed.

Would Assad have behaved differently had Moscow remained silent? Not likely. In this instance, Moscow could afford to be "helpful" because it was urging a policy that suited Syria's needs. But if by "helpful" one means a readiness to pressure a client in a direction that it prefers not to go, or to resist a client's major initiative, then since 1967 Moscow has not been helpful in any effort to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, at no time since the June War has Moscow ever pressured any prime client—whether it was Syria, Iraq, Libya, or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—in a manner even remotely comparable to Washington's pressure on Israel. The reason for this Soviet reluctance is simple: continued close relations with its Arab clients are more important to the Soviet leadership than an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict or any possible improvement in relations with the United States.

Soviet leaders have no intention of taking any steps that might help move the Egyptian-Israeli treaty toward a comprehensive settlement. Moreover, they do not believe that their opposition to United States policy in the Middle East will adversely affect prospects for a SALT agreement or expanded economic ties—two important Soviet objectives. The Soviet press persistently denounces the treaty and the United States policy that fashioned it. For example, on April 2, 1979, *Pravda* accused the United States of buying Egypt and Israel with financial and military aid, in order to form "a military-political alliance spearheaded against the Arab peoples and designed to strengthen United States presence in the Middle and Near East, a presence shaken as a result of the revolution in Iran and the disintegration of the CEN-TO (Central Treaty Organization) bloc." Moscow sees the United States as its adversary in the Arab arena.

IRAN

The revolution in Iran, culminating in the overthrow of the Shah in early 1979, yielded significant short-term benefits for the Soviet Union; the longer-term consequences for the U.S.S.R. are, however, less clear.

Soviet-Iranian relations, poor between 1945 and 1961, improved gradually after 1962 when the Shah announced that no United States military bases or missile sites would be permitted on Iranian territory. Although Iran was a member of a pro-Western military pact, she did not keep large military forces along the Soviet-Iranian border, a fact that made her participation in CENTO tolerable to Moscow and played an important role in the Soviet-Iranian rapprochement. Economic ties expanded greatly. The U.S.S.R. built a major steel plant and various factories and other industrial projects; in return, it received natural gas and oil. Increasingly, the government-to-government relationship improved, to the point that the Shah even returned Soviet defectors.

Iran had experienced periodic social unrest and political protests—the frustrated responses of its people to rampant inflation, urban blight, agrarian dislocation and extensive corruption, on the one hand, and dictatorial rule and repressive policies, on the other. For complex reasons, in the late spring of 1978, the disparate oppositionist groups against the Shah found a unifying symbol in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the 79-year old religious leader who had been exiled by the Shah in 1962. Events moved with startling rapidity, so that by mid-January, 1979, the Shah was forced to leave the country in the hands of a caretaker government. Within a month, Khomeini had returned, overthrown the caretaker government, and established an Islamic Republic.

The Soviet role in these momentous and unexpected developments remains a subject of speculation. In the early stages of the anti-Shah protests—from late spring to early fall, 1978—Soviet commentators generally restricted themselves essentially to reporting what was happening in the cities and oil fields. They did not turn against the Shah or proclaim his imminent demise. Moscow, like Washington, was surprised by the Shah's ineptness.

Gradually, Soviet broadcasts began to criticize the Shah's government, attacked United States involvement in Iran, and demanded that "United States imperialism be kicked out of the country." A turning point in the Kremlin's attitude came on November 19, 1978, when Brezhnev issued a statement noting Moscow's opposition to any outside interference in Iran. In effect, he was warning Washington that should the United States attempt to act directly to keep the Shah in power, the Soviet Union might undertake an intervention of its own in accordance with a 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty concerning threats to the territorial integrity of the country. By January, 1979, Moscow had decided that the Shah would not hold. Soviet anti-American agitation acquired an incendiary dimension; and Communist agents played an important (but as yet only imperfectly understood) role in aggravating labor unrest in the oil fields (where the

Communists are influential among the Arab and Kurdish workers), thereby contributing to the general economic paralysis that finally undermined the Shah's position.

The fall of the Shah, in general, was a boon to Moscow and, of course, a grievous setback for the United States. Soviet benefits are considerable. First of all, the Khomeini regime shut down the American-manned electronic intelligence-gathering stations situated along the Soviet border. These stations had enabled the United States to collect data on Soviet nuclear and missile-testing in Soviet Central Asia and were important for the effective verification of the SALT I agreement. Their loss creates a large gap in United States surveillance of Soviet military activities. Second, Iran has cut back her arms purchases drastically; she no longer aspires to become a major military power. Third, the new Iranian government disclaims any intention of playing an active role in maintaining the stability of pro-Western governments in the Gulf region. Thus, should there be another rebellion against the Sultan of Oman, Iran would not (as it did in 1975) send troops to save this pro-Western Arab leader. The retreat of Iran from a position of responsibility in the Gulf may pave the way for Soviet diplomacy, which seeks to establish normal relations with all the countries of the area, and not just Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. Washington has lost its prized policeman in the Gulf, a development that opens all kinds of possibilities for the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the new Iranian government broke off diplomatic relations with Israel in late February, 1979, ended the sale of oil to Israel, and turned over the Israeli embassy to Yasir Arafat and the PLO. Iran's move toward alignment with the Arab confrontation states has weakened not only Israel but Egypt as well. Fifth, Iran withdrew from CENTO, thereby sealing the fate of this Western-sponsored military alliance against the Soviet Union. Moscow can view with deep satisfaction the dismantling of a pro-Western military-political bastion on its southern flank. Finally, Moscow has learned a great deal about some of the most advanced military hardware in the United States arsenal. In the chaos that attended the Shah's collapse, Moscow must be presumed to have obtained manuals and photographs of the sophisticated F-14 fighter plane, the Phoenix missile system, and the improved version of the Hawk anti-aircraft missile. Thanks to the uncritical policy of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford of selling the Shah all the weapons he wanted (but could not possibly absorb) and the slowness of the Carter administration to take preventive measures, the Soviet military (through its agents in Iran) reaped a rich harvest of information about the top United States secret weapons. The Iranian revolution has been a boon to Moscow in strategic and military areas.

Economically, however, Moscow suffered from the disruption of Iranian natural gas deliveries. Although near normal deliveries have been resumed, the Iranian government has decided not to go ahead with the construction (nearly completed) of a second, much larger pipeline, known as IGAT-2. Failure during the next few years to complete the 780-mile-long pipeline and reach agreement on long-term deliveries would create serious economic problems for Soviet planners (and Western customers). Soviet industrial projects in Iran are also being curtailed. In the long term, Moscow may find Iranian Islamic fundamentalism troublesome, especially in the potentially explosive spheres of religion and ethnic discontent.

THE YEMENS

Ever since the mid-1950's, the Soviet Union has sought a foothold in the Yemeni sector of the Arabian Peninsula in order to align itself with anti-Western groups, to bring pressure on Saudi Arabia, and to establish a military presence near the entrance to the Red Sea. From 1962 to 1967, Moscow provided the arms and logistical support that made Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's intervention in the Yemeni civil war possible. In 1968, when a change of leadership in Yemen sharply reduced Soviet prospects, the neighboring British crown colony of Aden—renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in November, 1970—became independent, adopted a radical policy and turned to Moscow for military and economic assistance. Soviet advisers and weapons have been essential for the PDRY, making possible its ongoing attempt to take over Yemen and unify the two Yemens by force; its campaign of subversion against Oman; and its pressure on Saudi Arabia.

At low cost and with minimum risk, Moscow has developed a strong foothold in the PDRY. It has acquired privileged access to the port of Aden, the best port in that part of the world. Aden's docking, storage and repair facilities, and its ample supply of water, became particularly important for the Soviet navy after it was evicted from Berbera in Somalia in late 1977. The PDRY also allows Soviet aircraft to fly reconnaissance missions from airfields near Aden; and its cooperation permitted Moscow to mount a major airlift of arms to Ethiopia during the Ethiopian-Somalian war of 1977-1978. Thus, Moscow has already received ample returns from its PDRY investment.

The political crosscurrents in the Yemeni sector of the Arabian Peninsula are complex and difficult to trace with precision. For example, in June, 1978, the top leaders in both Yemen and the PDRY were murdered, possibly caused by personal vendettas and innate Yemeni intrigue. However, some analysts believe that the Soviet Union was implicated in each

affair, if only because the U.S.S.R. benefited directly as a consequence: the murder of Yemeni President Ahmad al-Ghashmi put an end to tentative efforts to improve relations between the two Yemens; and the murder of PDRY President Salim Rubayyi Ali gave undisputed power to Fatah Ismail and his Marxist-Leninist group. Certainly, Moscow has expanded its presence and activities in the PDRY since Fatah Ismail assumed complete power.

The Soviets may become more entrenched in the PDRY as a result of Washington's decision to sell large quantities of weapons to Yemen. Renewed fighting between the two Yemens erupted in February, 1979. A hurried and effective mediation effort by the Arab League was pushed by Syria and Iraq to forestall direct superpower involvement in regional crises on the Arabian Peninsula. The United States, however, to demonstrate its credibility to the Saudis and regain some of the prestige it lost when the Shah fell, agreed to provide the Yemens with \$400-million worth of modern weapons.

This overly militarized response may not strengthen the corrupt, tribal, backward Yemeni government; nor is it likely to reassure the Saudis. What it does do is heighten the PDRY's dependence on Moscow; and enables Moscow to go to the Yemens and offer Soviet "good offices" to influence Fatah Ismail to improve relations with Yemen. Moscow's aim is influence, not territory. The Soviet Union wants to play the role of arbiter of regional disputes, with good relations with both sides, in much the way the British operated in their heyday in the area.

SAUDI ARABIA

For Moscow, a prize seems within reach—the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Lower Gulf. The overthrow of the Shah and the polarization that crystalized in the Arab world against Egyptian President Anwar Sadat greatly intensified Saudi apprehensions and narrowed Riyadh's options. Saudi Arabia, which joined the Arab rejectionist bloc and broke diplomatic relations with Egypt, finds itself the object of a persistent Soviet diplomatic courtship, as Moscow tries to convey reasonableness and moderation. The Soviet leadership seeks the reestablishment of formal diplomatic ties between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, and

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"Soviet policy had focused on the perceived need to contain China. One prong of this policy was based on the ideological rivalry for leadership of third world revolutionary movements. . . . The new Soviet ability to intervene in distant arenas highlighted China's (logistical) inability to compete. China's frantic scrambling to counter the impression of impotence added to the damage by suggesting that her ideological commitment might be as hollow as her military capability."

Sino-Soviet Crisis in Perspective

BY C. G. JACOBSEN

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A Sino-Soviet crisis erupted with China's February, 1979, war against Vietnam. This was a unique war, in which each belligerent—China, Vietnam, and Vietnam's ally, the Soviet Union—could be said to have emerged victorious. Ironically, this was to prove destabilizing rather than stabilizing. Before delving into battlefield details and the subsequent course of events, however, it is necessary to place them in a longer term perspective.

Since 1972, the Soviet Union's eastern policy has been in transition. Chinese Communist party Chairman Mao Zedong's final years and the succession uncertainties reopened the possibility that Sino-Soviet relations could be normalized. The gang of four had espoused Mao's anti-Sovietism at its most vitriolic. Deputy Chairman Deng Xiaoping's administrative record, on the other hand, encouraged cautious optimism in Moscow (as it did in Washington). Yet the Hua Guofeng*—Deng Xiaoping compromise regime retained assertively nationalistic anti-Sovietism as one of its prime public policy planks. By late 1978/early 1979, although it still focused its anti-Chinese propaganda on the person of Hua, Moscow had clearly resigned itself to a period of high tension.

China continued to insist on obviously unacceptable preconditions for negotiation; an increasingly brusque Soviet stance mirrored growing skepticism in Moscow about the prospects of accommodation, and renewed interest in containment and other damage-limiting options. In March, 1978, when China rejected a Soviet offer to discuss improved relations (because of Moscow's refusal to consider a goodwill gesture of a border pull-back), Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev and Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov made highly publicized Far Eastern "inspection" trips. Then, within a fortnight of the late April resumption of border negotiations, Beijing accused Moscow of a border violation involving the purported abduction of Chinese citizens. Moscow replied that the violation was a "mistake," resulting from the

*Chinese Premier and Chairman of the Chinese Communist party.

"pursuit of a dangerous criminal." When Beijing declared the explanation incongruous and unacceptable, it was ignored.

Soviet policy had focused on the perceived need to contain China. One prong of this policy was based on the ideological rivalry for leadership of third world revolutionary movements. Until the mid-1970's, Soviet verbal and physical caution gave the advantage to vigorous Maoist rhetoric. The Soviet demonstration of new found distant power projection, in Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia in early 1978, changed the balance. The new Soviet ability to intervene in distant arenas highlighted China's (logistical) inability to compete. China's frantic scrambling to counter the impression of impotence added to the damage by suggesting that her ideological commitment might be as hollow as her military capability. Certainly, China's alliance with the American-supported and rather reactionary National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) movement in Angola began a process of disillusionment that would split many Western Maoist parties and groupings.

The de facto anti-Mao campaign of the Hua-Deng leadership further alienated many Western Maoists. More important, it seriously undermined the "idealistic" connotation of Mao and Mao's China in the third world. Once Moscow had shown its willingness actively to promote distant interests, Beijing's remaining advantage lay in the fact that its ideological stance appeared purer and less self-serving. That advantage was being lost, with gleeful help from a Moscow that appeared oblivious of the irony involved. Mozambique and Tanzania, Beijing's staunchest African allies before 1975, became pragmatic supporters of Soviet (and Cuban) African policies. Albania, China's only European ally, denounced her new policies.

The other element in Soviet containment efforts was more direct. The Soviet Union strove to undermine any movement to formalize the complementarity between China's new policy stance and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) interests. Moscow reacted with outrage when prominent Western security

representatives (like Britain's Air Marshal Neil Cameron or United States presidential adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) suggested the commonality of anti-Sovietism; and the Soviet Union warned repeatedly against the sale of Western arms to China (the proposed British Harrier jet sales drew the most ire through 1978). A purported hardening of Moscow's arms control negotiating stance was attributed at least partly to Western receptivity to Chinese courting. Conversely, China's only attempt to supplement her NATO contacts by undermining the Soviet Union's position in East Europe—an attempt symbolized by Hua's visits to Bucharest and Belgrade—was countered by Soviet hints that Moscow and Tirana might once again find a communion of interests.

Moscow tried to ward off the prospect of a Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty. Soviet concern about this treaty was heightened by the upsurge of nationalistic pro-military sentiment in Japan. Nevertheless, there was little indication of the kind of willingness to compromise that one might have thought would have been induced by this specter. With regard to the disputed islands' issue, Moscow proved unwilling to countenance the sacrifices that its purpose would have required. Similarly, at least to a degree, the late 1978 normalizing of Sino-American relations reflected Moscow's refusal to contemplate strategic arms (SALT) and other concessions that might have stayed Washington's decision to "play the China card."

Moscow's preferred policy options lay elsewhere. Along the Chinese border, on the northern flank, Moscow was apparently content with the basic force size that followed the border skirmishes of 1969. But the pace of qualitative Soviet upgrading effort accelerated. The Far Eastern region was accorded priority in the early delivery of mobile SS20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. It also received the latest generation combat aircraft, including the newest MiG-23 and 27 variants (the Soviet air force inventory facing China was numbered at 1,800 by mid-1978). The sixth airborne division, stationed at Khabarovsk, was brought up to full strength, 7,200 men. Although clearly targeted primarily against Manchuria/Beijing, the division made the politically telling move of parachute maneuvers on one of the Japanese-claimed islands opposite Hokkaido. (Japanese sources asserted that 5,000 troops were stationed on the islands and that permanent bases were being constructed on two of them.) A fourth major naval port was reportedly being constructed at Korsakov, on southern Sakhalin island.

But the most noteworthy news of 1978 came late in the fall, with Japanese reports that Moscow was assigning modern Delta-class strategic submarines to the Pacific fleet (they had previously been assigned only to the northern fleet), and that she intended to

transfer at least one of her new VTOL aircraft carriers. The latter, in particular, would substantially enhance her interventionary potential off China's coast.

There were also Soviet initiatives on the potential southern flank of a direct conflict. China was at least one factor in Moscow's Afghan policy when an April, 1978, coup installed a regime in Afghanistan friendly to the U.S.S.R. And there is some evidence of a "China consideration" when the June, 1978, coup in South Yemen installed a pro-Moscow faction of South Yemen's National Liberation Front. But whatever the relevance of the "China consideration" there can be no doubt that Beijing provided the glue of the crucial Soviet-Vietnamese alliance that was cemented during 1978.

The strengthening of Moscow-Hanoi ties was heralded in 1977 when the Soviet Union supported Vietnam's reaffirmations of her sovereignty claim over the Spratly and Paracel islands. (China occupied two of the latter just before the American disengagement from Vietnam, and remained entrenched.) Through 1978, Moscow steadfastly supported Vietnam in her growing military-political-economic confrontation with China. Leery of too great a reliance on the Soviet Union, Vietnam long strove to settle her differences with China. But Beijing's ostentatious championing of the Chinese minority in Vietnam stirred xenophobic memories of the attempts of earlier Chinese regimes to vassalize the peninsula. The ghost of ancient battles against encroachment from the north enlivened Vietnam's fears of fifth column potentials. The response, the stepped-up expulsion of Vietnam's Chinese business community, served in classic fashion to defuse these fears while simultaneously satisfying the demands of chauvinist resentment and ambition. The oldest dictum of realpolitik, seek out your enemy's enemy, made Hanoi increasingly receptive to the blandishments of Moscow.

China's punitive cutting off of all aid to Hanoi on July 3, 1978, was followed on July 29 by Vietnam's formal accession to Comecon (the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). China's throttling of aid to Hanoi had been heralded by the withdrawal of most of China's nearly 20,000-man construction corps in Laos. An additional spur to Vietnam's Comecon move, the withdrawal had the immediate effect of conceding Hanoi's dominance in the area. Subsequent Thai reports that a Soviet missile tracking and intelligence gathering radar facility had been established in the Laotian border town of Suvannakhet served to spotlight the reason for Peking's displeasure.

The unraveling of China's southern flank position continued. Public Chinese commitments to the anti-Vietnamese Pol Pot regime of "Democratic Kampuchea" (Cambodia) were followed by the signing of

a Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty in November. The announcement of Peking-Washington ties in December was followed within a fortnight by the Vietnam-sponsored "uprising" (cum invasion) that swept Cambodia in January, 1979.

The coincidence of timing was, of course, just that. The organizing and planning of Pol Pot's overthrow began with that regime's suicidally provocative incursions into South Vietnam in January, 1978 (the southern Vietnamese province had once been controlled by the Khmers/Cambodians). Yet the appearance of sequence was arresting. With the media still eulogizing the mutual benefit of China's rapprochement with Washington, Beijing suddenly found itself more confined by Soviet initiatives than ever before. Amidst speculation that the nebulous Chinese-American alliance might offer leverage against Moscow, China found that she had to swallow the abject humiliation of watching a neighboring Soviet ally overturning the only South Asian regime to which she had committed herself, in utter defiance of a Chinese military buildup on its border.

By supporting Vietnam, Moscow changed East Asian power calculations. Earlier, China could be relatively confident that Soviet options for pressure were limited either to border incidents, which could be tolerated, or to all-out nuclear assault, an eventuality that few analysts thought Moscow would contemplate except as a last resort. The fact that Soviet opprobrium could be expressed physically only by too little or too much led to considerable license for defiant action on China's part. In 1978, however, Moscow was acquiring a range of options for a medium-level power response. The Soviet Union might, for example, give decisive support to a still more assertive Vietnamese presence on or around the Spratlies and Paracels, especially if seismic data on oil abundance were confirmed. The Soviet Union might itself under certain circumstances acquire "facilities" on one of the islands. Its superior naval capabilities would be eminently useful should it decide to extend Soviet protection of the Vietnamese homeland seaward. Or Soviet/Vietnamese initiatives might be taken vis-à-vis the hitherto Beijing-oriented rebels of Thailand's hinterland. The power that the shadow of Moscow's presence gives Hanoi is of course complemented by Moscow's very real military advantage in having a large, tough and well-equipped ally on China's southern border.

One of China's greatest advantages has been her geographical location and its implicit threat of a two-front war. The mutually advantageous realpolitik alliance between Moscow and Hanoi meant that a similar threat became a fact of life for Chinese planners. And there was little chance that Beijing could finesse the finesse, for example by perpetuating anti-Vietnamese Khmer guerrilla activities. Geography

and other power determinants (the state of logistics, power projection means) favored Hanoi—and Moscow—at least in the longer term.

China's predicament was placed in sharp relief during and immediately after Deng Xiaoping's historic visit to the United States early in 1979. Again and again, it was made clear that China could not accept Vietnam's "brazen interference" in Cambodia. Japanese sources described a further influx of Chinese land and air units to staging areas near Vietnam's border. The United States shied away from explicit support. And Thailand ducked repeated Chinese requests to allow arms transit to forces opposed to the new masters of Phnom Penh. But Vietnam's navy appeared finally to have succeeded in choking off Chinese gun-running to Cambodia's coast and islands. This meant that to have a chance of success action could not be long postponed.

Moscow tried to prevent Chinese action. A Soviet naval squadron sailed into the Gulf of Tonkin. In Moscow, Premier Aleksei Kosygin said that China's outrageous charges against Vietnam and the Soviet Union were akin to a declaration of war, and Kremlin leaders (in the guise of an "Alexandrov" commentary in *Pravda*) warned that China must end her "unconcealed military pressure" on Hanoi. More intensive air patrols and fighter sorties along the border underlined the Soviet stance. Yet the momentum of China's commitment and buildup, said to have reached between 330,000 and 360,000 men (probably exaggerated), was not immediately deflected.

THE WAR

On the morning of February 17, 1979, tank-led assaults crossed the length of the border. Beijing claimed the intent was to "punish" Vietnam, not to occupy or annex territory permanently. But Chinese forces soon funneled into what looked like two Hanoi-directed prongs, through Lang Son and Lao Cai. Hanoi's defenses, down to about 50,000 men (many of the best divisions remained in the south, supporting the new Cambodian regime's pacification efforts) deployed in an arc north of the capital. On day one the Chinese forces reportedly gained 10 kilometers. Although she claimed limited success (200-250 Chinese troops killed; an undisclosed number of tanks disabled), Vietnam immediately called for Soviet and world support. Moscow reacted with a sharp initial condemnation of the invasion. By day two, with Chinese forces 16 kilometers into Vietnamese territory, the Soviet Union followed with a sharper warning to withdraw while there was yet time. Moscow said categorically that it would live up to the mutual defense obligations implied by the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty (asserting considerable faith in Vietnam's ability to repel the aggressors) and orchestrated a national outpouring of outrage. The

same day saw more confident assertions from Hanoi (a considerable number of Chinese units were declared to have been destroyed or surrounded), and the first reports of Vietnamese bombing inside China. On the third day, Hanoi claimed that 3,500 Chinese troops had been killed and over 80 tanks destroyed. Chinese forces were said to be only 10 kilometers from the border. There was speculation that the strength of resistance and outside pressure might be forcing reevaluation and withdrawal. Vietnam signed a defiant concordat with its Phnom Penh allies, as Washington's "intelligence" told of evidence that Moscow was considering its own mini-invasion of China; in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping hastened to stress the limited (though still ill-defined) nature of China's intent. The question of Chinese withdrawal became uncertain; Washington sources talked of lack of clear evidence. Soviet spokesmen announced that their forces had been put on alert.

The next day brought news of increased fighting, some new Chinese advances (especially around Lao Cai), and further Chinese troop reinforcements. Hanoi countered by recalling some of its Cambodian-based forces. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko repeated Moscow's blunt warnings. The Chinese evacuation of Manchurian and Sinkiang border regions and an alert of troops in these areas were announced. The following day, the fifth, saw China pressing an attack against Lang Son. But Hanoi asserted that this attack had been beaten back, thus offsetting the psychological effect of apparent Chinese success against Lao Cai. Hanoi took time out to celebrate Vietnam's new treaty-defined status in Cambodia. (The treaty specified that Vietnam had the right to station "advisers" in Cambodia to "preserve the territorial integrity" of that nation—the same language that earlier formalized the Vietnamese presence in Laos.) Soviet planes repeated earlier overflights over the battle zone and, according to Japanese evidence, began overflights over sectors of China's Pacific coast; Soviet naval detachments in the South China Sea and off Vietnam were reinforced.

Beijing was apparently battling for a symbolic field victory that would allow withdrawal accompanied by a "mission accomplished" claim, gambling that this could be effected before (and without precipitating) major Soviet initiatives. Moscow, on the other hand, clearly hoped that force demonstrations would suffice, or that Vietnam would succeed in repelling the invaders without outside aid. The fact that Hanoi had not yet committed its best battle-hardened divisions encouraged at least some optimism on this score. The optimism was buttressed by Vietnamese statements that while conducting "a very close exchange of views" with Moscow, "we are prepared [at present] to cope with the worst situation."

Such an outcome would leave a Soviet public

relations advantage of major proportions. India had issued a cautious condemnation of China's action. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had terminated its 14-year relationship with Beijing. Others were following suit. The suggestion of aggressive Chinese tendencies doused the prospect of Western arms sales—posing acute embarrassment for British Industry Minister Eric Varley, en route to Beijing to complete a major deal centering on the Harrier fighter. The tarring-by-association of the United States (Tass noted that *The New York Times* found grounds "to state that the United States was informed about China's forthcoming attack against Vietnam") suggested United States complicity and reinforced allegations that Beijing had become a conscious tool of "imperialist" ambition. China was said to be acting as a proxy for American interests bent on revenging their own humiliation at the hands of Hanoi. This was a propaganda theme that found receptive ears. However, this theme also acted as a goal to Beijing, making it more difficult for China to withdraw without some achievement of substance.

The sixth day of the war began with a Chinese advance beyond Lao Cai, to about 25 kilometers from the border, and a major Chinese buildup against Lang Son. It was reported that a Soviet troop concentration was in progress along the Sino-Soviet frontier and that troops in Outer Mongolia had mobilized (it was not clear whether this referred to Mongolian forces, or only to Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia).

The second week of fighting opened with a large-scale Soviet sealoft of missiles and matériel to Haiphong. China was said to have launched limited air strikes against inland warehouses supposed to have received some of the supplies, but damage was acknowledged to be limited. A major Soviet airlift was also reported. By the next day a three-front Chinese artillery barrage was described as more intense than anything seen during the United States engagement in Vietnam. Yet, while Moscow was coordinating steadily mounting pressure and support in aid of its ally, it did not call up the reserves needed to provide a full complement for all its Far Eastern border divisions.

In fact, Moscow appeared increasingly confident that Vietnam would succeed in thwarting Beijing. The Chinese statement later that day that China would "not move into the flatlands of the Red River Delta"—a de facto concession that Hanoi was immune—might have been a belated defining of original modesty; but it probably bore a relation to problems on the ground and around the periphery. Still, while Beijing apparently found it necessary to specify that China would not (or could not) defy the presumed limit to relative Soviet restraint, she needed one victory of seeming substance. Japanese officials announced their belief that "the mauling of at least one Vietnamese division" was China's aim and that a final

concerted Chinese buildup and drive to this end was in progress. The massive artillery shelling continued. Hanoi serenely (if perhaps deceptively so) repeated claims of mounting Chinese casualties. And if the figure of over 16,000 Chinese killed was exaggerated, many analysts nevertheless gave credence to assertions that China had suffered disproportionately high casualty rates. The crawling and, indeed, halting pace of China's advance, against less than Hanoi's best, gave heart to her antagonist(s).

China's original invasion plans had clearly gone astray. Fighting continued at an intense level. No further Chinese advances were reported, however. In fact, Beijing had to acknowledge the galling news that Vietnam had made two substantial counterthrusts into China. One roving battalion had struck towards Nanning at the end of the first week of fighting and had operated inside China for at least three days. Furthermore, it appeared that reports of Chinese "strategic" bombing inside Vietnam had been exaggerated and were possibly fictitious.

Increasing Chinese pressure focused on Lang Son. Amid constant artillery barrages between the defenders and Chinese concentrations to the north, east and west, Chinese infantry evidently launched a number of "human wave" assaults on the town below. But while many of the town's facilities, including the hospital, were destroyed by the incessant shelling, physical occupation was thwarted again and again. Vietnam claimed to be inflicting "heavy losses," putting total Chinese dead at 27,000. The Lang Son battle became psychologically important because it saw the involvement of one of Hanoi's finer infantry divisions, the first Vietnamese front-line division.

Vietnam had employed only militia and regional forces, not main-force army units; their rather astonishing success not only reflected on their mettle, but flaunted and acutely embarrassed China's hope to brake some of Hanoi's vaunted front-line troops. The presence of regular Vietnamese troops in Lang Son acted as a magnet for Chinese reinforcements. The first Chinese claim that she had taken Lang Son came on the final day of the second week of fighting. Even then, Hanoi refuted the claim. Apparently, China's flanking pressure led to a limited and ordered withdrawal by the defenders. Subsequent "Thai intelligence sources" indicated that the town of Lang Son had not actually been occupied. Although Chinese forces had extended their hold on the surrounding highlands, Vietnamese defenders remained entrenched in the hills to the south and southeast.

China's battlefield problems were compounded by an intensification of Soviet pressure. Rumors were rife that Moscow would send "volunteers" to the Vietnamese front and *Pravda* warned that the war could expand if China did not withdraw "immediately." Kosygin declared that Vietnam "will not be aban-

doned in a time of trial." (He also warned against a Chinese invasion of Laos and declared that "the changes that have taken place in Cambodia are irreversible.") Brezhnev threatened that a Laotian incursion would bring "harsh retribution," and there was another notching up of Soviet naval strength and activity in the South China Sea.

As the third week began, Chinese officials did indeed talk of imminent withdrawal; by day 16 Japanese sources claimed that some withdrawal had in fact begun. But the same day saw Hanoi exhibiting Chinese prisoners, the first airlift speeding Vietnamese reinforcements northward, and a declaration of general Vietnamese mobilization—for a "war of resistance." The day also brought "informed" speculation that Moscow would feel impelled sooner or later to administer "punishment" even if China extricated herself. Hanoi asserted that the battle for Lang Son was in fact continuing. This was followed by a Chinese statement that she was beginning to withdraw her forces and a call for future friendship. Vietnam, however, declared the statement to be a sham, a smokescreen for continued assault, and said that she was pressing the fight. The rationale for the conflict had already been overtaken by the morass of the battlefield; it appeared that its termination might be equally confounding to the assumptions of planners—one of history's oldest lessons.

On March 6 with three front-line divisions reportedly readied for attack, Vietnam said that she would negotiate peace, if China withdrew immediately, totally and unconditionally. The next day brought a Hanoi claim of "splendid victory" (contrasting with Beijing assertions that China's "aims" had been achieved), a statement that Chinese troops would be allowed to withdraw unmolested, and a warning that any further Chinese combat activity would be "severely punished." Specifically, Hanoi asserted that the molesting of civilians and looting of homes, purportedly engaged in by retreating Chinese, had to stop or Vietnam would rescind her promise to allow unharassed withdrawal. China claimed 10,000 Vietnamese killed or wounded, 1,000 prisoners; Hanoi said it had "put out of action 45,000 enemy soldiers, 273 tanks and armored personnel carriers and hit hundreds of artillery pieces and mortars." Japan began to

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"The Soviet Union has made it clear that it regards nuclear power plants as a safe and reliable form of electrical energy generation," notes this specialist. "In the 1980's, it should become clearer whether the cautious stance of the United States or the full-throttle approach of the Soviet Union with regard to the development of the peaceful atom will be the wiser course."

Nuclear Energy in the Soviet Union

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FEW topics are more controversial in the West than the future of nuclear power. This is not true in the Soviet Union, however, where the development of atomic power stations is currently receiving high priority and where there is no doubt, at least at the official level, about the desirability of a nuclear energy future.

The Soviet Union has a long history of atomic power development; its first nuclear reactor for generating commercial electricity went into operation in June, 1954.¹ Subsequently, the Soviet Union actively

country's total electrical generating capacity (from all types of plants) of approximately 247,000 megawatts (see Table 1). Although this percentage is fairly small, it is expected to increase steadily as new atomic stations under construction are brought on line during the early and mid-1980's. The anticipated pace of construction is illustrated by the fact that in the first 20 years of the commercial nuclear era in the U.S.S.R. (through 1975) about 5,500 megawatts were installed, whereas in the tenth five year plan (1976-1980) alone the goal is to place in operation an additional 13,200 megawatts. By 1990, the share of nuclear power is to increase from the present 4 percent to about 10-15 percent of the national total.

Nuclear power stations in the Soviet Union have usually been constructed in regions of the country that are or are expected to be deficient in conventional electrical generating resources (meaning, in the Soviet context, fossil fuels and hydroelectricity). For this reason, virtually all existing and planned generating plants have been built in, or west of, the Urals economic region; that is, essentially in the European area of the country. The only exception is the very small generating station at Bilibino, which is in a very remote location in the Chukchi tundra. The developed southern portion of Siberia, with its vast resources of coal, oil and hydropower, needs no nuclear power development. On the other hand, all portions of the European U.S.S.R., including the coal-rich Ukraine, are witnessing large-scale development of nuclear power. This reflects the increasing depth and expense of Donbass coal and the post-peak status of most of the Baku and Volga-Ural oil fields. Following in the footsteps of the United States, the Soviet Union also has an incipient fossil fuel pinch, and apparently nuclear power, despite its high capital cost characteristic, is the energy form that will increasingly provide electrical power in socialist East Europe.

Almost all existing commercial nuclear reactors are the light-water fission type (as opposed to breeders). There are several varieties of fission reactors that differ from one another mainly in the type of coolant

TABLE 1: Total Electric Generating Capacity

End of Year	Generating Capacity (MW)	
	Nuclear	Total
1955	5	37,200
1960	605	66,700
1965	970	115,000
1970	1,550	166,100
1975	5,500	217,500
1978	9,900	ca. 247,000
1980 (Plan)	18,700	284,000

Source: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1975g.*, p. 235; *Pravda*, January 20, 1979, p. 1; and Table 2.

pursued research in fission, fusion and breeder reactors, as well as considerable research in applications of atomic energy for purposes other than electrical generation (e.g., atomic reactors for ships and "peaceful" explosive uses). Today, Soviet spokesmen consider their nuclear energy program at a "take-off" point, with development in the future expected to proceed at a pace that will greatly exceed that of the past.

As of January 1, 1979, the Soviet Union had constructed approximately 10,000 megawatts (MW) of installed nuclear electrical generating capacity (9,910 MW).² This amounted to 4 percent of the

¹For a report on this reactor, see D.I. Blokhintsev and N.A. Nikolayev, "The First Atomic Power Station of the USSR and the Prospects of Atomic Power Development," *Proceedings of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*, vol. 3, "Power Reactors" (New York: United Nations, 1955), pp. 35-55.

²Derived from Table 2.

TABLE 2: Nuclear Power Reactors in the U.S.S.R.

Station name and reactor number	Year completed	Commercial MW
Obninsk	1954	5
Siberian	1958	600 ^a
Obninsk	1959	5
Beloyarskiy-1	1964	100
Novovoronezhskiy-1	1964	210
Dimitrovgrad	1965	50
Beloyarskiy-2	1967	200
Novovoronezhskiy-2	1969	365
Dimitrovgrad	1969	12
Novovoronezhskiy-3	1971	440
Novovoronezhskiy-4	1972	440
Shevchenko	1973	150
Bilibino-1, 2, 3	1973-75	36
Kola-1	1973	440
Leningrad-1	1973	1000
Kola-2	1974	440
Leningrad-2	1975	1000
Bilibino-4	1976	12
Kursk-1	1976	1000
Armenia-1	1976	405
Chernobyl ¹ -1	1977	1000
Chernobyl ¹ -2	1978	1000
Kursk-2	1978	1000
Novovoronezhskiy-5	(1979)	1000
Leningrad-3	(1979)	1000
Rovno-1	(1979)	440
Beloyarskiy-3	(1979)	600
Armenia-2	(1979)	410
Kursk-3	(1980)	1000
Leningrad-4	(1980)	1000
Rovno-2	(1980)	440
South Ukraine-1	(1980)	1000
Smolensk-1	(1980)	1000
Kola-3	(1980)	440
Kola-4	(1980)	440
Kalinin-1, 2, 3, 4	(after 1980)	1000 each
West Ukraine-1, 2, 3, 4	(after 1980)	1000 each
South Ukraine-2, 3, 4	(after 1980)	1000 each
Kursk-4	(after 1980)	1000
Chernobyl ¹ -3, 4	(after 1980)	1000 each
Smolensk-2	(after 1980)	1000
Ignalina-1, 2	(after 1980)	1500 each

^aThe "Siberian" facility (believed to be located at Troitsk just east of the Urals) is thought to be involved with producing fissionable materials for weapons, and may have been expanded to a size in excess of 600 MW.

Source: From the author's compilations as published in Chapter 6 of L. Dienes and T. Shabad, *The Soviet Energy System* (Washington, D.C.: V.H. Winston, 1979), p. 156.

used and the way the intensity of the reaction in the core is modified or controlled. Among the common types are boiling water reactors, pressurized water reactors, gas cooled reactors and graphite moderated reactors. Boiling water reactors are an early design of somewhat lower efficiency, and few are being built for large-scale commercial operations today in either the Soviet Union or the West. Gas cooled reactors, although common in Europe, have not been successfully built for commercial operation in the United States, and are nonexistent in the Soviet Union.

³The operating data for the VVER-440 reactors found at these sites is given in *Soviet Atomic Energy*, vol. 44, no. 4 (October, 1978), p. 343ff.

Most commercial United States reactors are of the pressurized water type, using water for cooling and moderating. In the U.S.S.R., about half the commercial reactors on line are pressurized water (designated by the Russian acronym VVER), and about half are graphite moderated (Russian acronym RBMK). However, most newer stations, and all existing stations over 1,000 MW, are of the graphite moderated type. As shown in Table 2, pressurized water reactors are in place or under construction at the Novovoronezh, Kola, Armenian and Rovno sites.³ The graphite moderated reactors are found at Beloyarsk (near Sverdlovsk), Leningrad, Kursk, Chernobyl (near Kiev), Smolensk and South Ukraine

(near Nikolayev). All these sites will have at least two, and some as many as four, individual reactors located at the complex. The RBMK-type (graphite moderated) reactors are of a design not found outside the U.S.S.R.⁴ Graphite moderated reactors tend to be bulkier, costlier and less efficient than pressurized water reactors, but at the same time they are technically simpler and somewhat less prone to malfunction.

Breeder reactors are technically complex, able to produce more fissionable material (uranium fuel) than they consume, hence the name. Few exist at present, due to their very high cost and to technical and safety problems (for example, the most common design uses liquid sodium, rather than water, as the coolant). The Soviet Union built its first small experimental breeder reactor in 1959, and placed its first (and at present only) commercial breeder reactor into operation in 1972 at the town of Shevchenko on the east coast of the Caspian Sea. The Shevchenko plant is a dual purpose facility, with most of its electrical output operating a desalinization plant at the same location.

Construction has been under way for some years on a more advanced breeder reactor (the BN-600) at Beloyarsk, adjacent to two existing nuclear units at the same site but in a separate compound. With the plant at Shevchenko producing electricity, the Soviet Union now operates the largest breeder reactor in the world, and with the completion of the 600 MW Beloyarsk-3 it will maintain its dominant position in this field of research. For the future, there are plans under discussion to build a 1,600 MW breeder reactor, with construction to begin in the early 1980's.⁵

Fusion reactors are still in the experimental stage but, because of their freedom from high level wastes and the plentifulness of their required fuels, are viewed very hopefully. The Soviet Union, which pioneered the "tokamak" design for the fusion reactors, is carrying on very advanced work in this area. However, commercial fusion reactors are still at least ten years in the future, and in recent years the United States has taken the lead in fusion research. Soviet

fusion research centers are the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, and other fusion research facilities in Khar'kov, Leningrad, Sukhumi and Novosibirsk.

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has standardized the design of its nuclear plants. Two main designs have been adopted. The first is the 440 MW pressurized water reactor, termed VVER-440 (which is exportable and has been constructed at several sites in East Europe and Finland). The 1,000 MW VVER reactor of the type now being built at Novovoronezh may in the future also become a "standard" design. The second is the 1,000 MW graphite moderated reactor, known as the RBMK-1000. So many plants using the latter type of reactor are projected that the Soviet Union plans to mass-produce them. To this end, a huge new factory (termed "Atomash," an acronym for "atomic machinery") is being built at the Don River town of Volgodonsk. The main assembly building has been reported as being 150 feet high and a half mile long, and is one of the main construction projects of the current five year plan. The plant was completed in December, 1978, to the point where production operations could begin on reactor vessels up to an annual output of 3,000 MW capacity.⁶

THE QUESTION OF SAFETY

The Soviet Union has made it clear that it regards nuclear power plants as a safe and reliable form of electrical energy generation. The leading journal of the nuclear power industry in the U.S.S.R. has stated that

there is every reason to consider [nuclear power] plants no more dangerous than conventional power plants. Radiation injury to the population is practically impossible, and any presumable emergency situation in nuclear power stations with water cooled, water moderated reactors cannot be of a catastrophic nature.⁷

Thus, the type of accident that occurred at the Three Mile Island plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which carried with it the real threat of a core meltdown, is apparently viewed (at least at the official level) as "impossible" at Soviet plants. However, some elements of Soviet society have lingering fears about nuclear power plant safety, as evidenced by occasional articles in the press that are clearly designed to dispel the concerns of doubters.

Indeed, Soviet reaction to Three Mile Island itself has been interesting and ambiguous. Two weeks after the accident, there appeared in the Soviet press on the same day (April 11, 1979) a strident article (targeted against private energy companies) that termed Three Mile Island "a serious, major accident, one that threatened at any moment to turn into a catastrophe, even a terrible tragedy," and an article that said that

the Western press's treatment of the atomic reactor accident at Harrisburg, in which essentially minor unfavorable consequences were depicted in an extreme-

⁴For a discussion of this type of reactor, see: A.M. Petros'yants et al., "The Leningrad Nuclear Power Station and the Outlook for Channel Type BWR's," *Soviet Atomic Energy*, vol. 31, no. 4 (October, 1971), p. 1086; also L. Dienes and T. Shabad, *The Soviet Energy System* (Washington, D.C.: V.H. Winston, 1979), pp. 154-8.

⁵For more details on the breeder program in the U.S.S.R. see *Soviet Power Reactors—1970* (Report of the U.S.A. nuclear power reactor delegation visit to the U.S.S.R., June 15-July 1, 1970), USAEC; also, Dienes and Shabad, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-3.

⁶*Izvestiya*, December 19, 1978, p. 1; *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, February, 1979, pp. 126-7.

⁷V.F. Ostashenko et al., "Some Safety Problems in Nuclear Power Plants with Water-Cooled, Water-Modulated Power Reactors," *Soviet Atomic Energy*, vol. 30, no. 2 (February, 1971), p. 157.

ly exaggerated form, was a continuation of the campaign against atomic power.⁸

Apparently, the Soviet nuclear establishment has not yet formulated a firm posture on the events at Harrisburg.

Yet nuclear accidents have occurred in the U.S.S.R., despite official statements to the contrary. The best documented of these was the 1973 explosion (believed to be in a steam line) at the Shevchenko breeder reactor on the Caspian Sea, in conjunction with which there may also have been a fire and a reduction in plant output.⁹ Other accidents and fires, some minor but others apparently of some consequence, have been reported at Soviet nuclear installations.¹⁰ Of greatest concern is the so-called "Kyshtym disaster," concerning which hard facts are scarce, although the fact of the accident is generally accepted. This involved a catastrophic explosion of either nuclear wastes or a nuclear reprocessing plant in the Urals, resulting in very high level radioactive contamination and the permanent evacuation of an area of many square miles.¹¹

Nonetheless, Soviet nuclear reactors are built without some of the elaborate and expensive safety features found at United States sites. All the early 440 MW reactors were built without the type of containment dome used on United States reactors, which the Soviet scientists consider an unnecessary appendage. However, the new 1,000 MW pressurized water reactor being built at Novovoronezh has been redesigned with a containment structure, despite the plant direc-

⁸*Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 11, 1979, p. 9, and *Izvestiya*, April 11, 1979, p. 2, both as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 31, no. 15 (May 9, 1979), pp. 2 and 4.

⁹In D. Yurchenko and G. Pomerantsev, "Fifth Anniversary of Start-Up of BN-350 Fast Reactor," *Soviet Atomic Energy*, vol. 45, no. 2 (February, 1979), p. 828, the electrical output of the Shevchenko breeder was listed as "up to 125 MW," whereas previously (as per Table 2) it had always been given as 150 MW. This article also refers to a total of 8 "steam generator deviations in operation . . . ; three of these being due to the entry of large quantities of water" at the Shevchenko breeder (p. 827).

¹⁰Press release by Rep. R.H. Michel (R-Ill.) quoting Pyotr Neporozhniy, Soviet Minister of Power and Electrification, April 23, 1979, printed in the *Washington Post* and elsewhere.

¹¹For a detailed discussion of the Kyshtym accident, see R. Gillette, "Nuclear Fears Spur Probe of 'The Accident,'" *Los Angeles Times*, May 21, 1979, pp. 1 and 18ff.

¹²A. Fisher, "A Russian Energy Tour," *Popular Science*, May, 1979, p. 69. See also J. Lewin, "The Russian Approach to Nuclear Reactor Safety," *Nuclear Safety*, vol. 18, no. 4 (July-August, 1977), pp. 438-450.

¹³Interviews with Dr. Vadim Artamkin, nuclear physicist with the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy and a member of the 1977 U.S.S.R. Los Angeles Exhibition staff, San Diego, November 22, 1977, and Los Angeles, November 26, 1977.

¹⁴*Izvestiya*, April 11, 1979, *loc. cit.*

¹⁵For a fuller review of siting, safety and waste disposal considerations, see Dienes and Shabad, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-169.

tor there reportedly referring to it as a "waste of money."¹² It is perhaps noteworthy that three Soviet nuclear projects are running considerably behind schedule, and that safety factors are probably involved in each case. One is the newest unit at Novovoronezh; a second is the plant in Armenia, the only one being built in a seismically active area in the U.S.S.R.; the third is the new breeder reactor at Beloyarsk, originally scheduled to be started up almost five years ago.

Nor is it entirely clear how the Soviet Union intends to dispose of high level and other radioactive wastes. Placing them in geologically stable formations is apparently the option selected, and recent information indicates that the high level wastes, at least, will first be solidified (vitrified), and that they will be stored near the surface in a retrievable fashion.¹³ Earlier experiments, however, involved deep burial. In any event, burial in salt formations, an option in the forefront in the United States, has probably been rejected in the U.S.S.R.

In keeping with its position that nuclear power plants are safe and reliable, and in order to make better use of the waste heat from such plants, the Soviet Union intends to locate such plants near or possibly even in major cities. The president of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has stated that

in accordance with an order of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, during the past year we worked with a design institute to develop an idea for using reactors in supplying heat to cities. They can be placed right in residential districts—that's how safe they are. The construction of atomic heat-supply stations of this sort has begun.¹⁴

No existing Soviet plant is located closer than about 22 miles from the center of a major city, but newer ones will be closer. Residential areas for plant workers are apparently built fairly close to the reactor site.¹⁵ Some of the smaller existing stations, like Kola and Bilibino, already supply heat for space heating and greenhouses.

With regard to radiation safety at nuclear plants under normal operating conditions, radiation standards were approved by the Ministry of Health in 1969. These standards, which were slightly revised in

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"As far as East Europe is concerned, a change in Soviet leadership may lead to ideological rigidity, barriers to contact with the West, orthodoxy in economic life and a crackdown on dissent, stifling developments toward a more relaxed atmosphere throughout the bloc."

Soviet Policies in East Europe

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EVER since the Red Army occupied most of East Europe some 35 years ago and guaranteed the installation of Communist-ruled governments in that area, Soviet leaders have regarded East Europe as a protective buffer and a forward deployment zone for their own troops.¹ Hence the continuing buildup of the military and the modernization of equipment, despite negotiations over the past six and one-half years for mutual reduction of forces by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

Much of East Europe also serves as an economic appendage to the U.S.S.R. but, in this respect, it may soon become a liability because of the anticipated energy crisis that will affect the Soviet Union's supply of petroleum to its client states.

An imminent problem that faces the Soviet Union and the East European states involves succession to the top leadership posts. What happens in the Kremlin will also affect developments in nonaligned Yugoslavia and perhaps even in isolated Albania.

All the East European states, except for Albania and Yugoslavia, are currently members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), which is dominated by the Soviet Union. The sixteenth session of the alliance's Political Consultative Committee most recently met in Moscow, in the first session in two years. It proposed that a world treaty should be signed on the renunciation of force, that NATO and WTO should agree not to expand their respective membership, and that maneuvers be limited to 50,000 or 60,000 men.²

All delegation heads signed this general communiqué. However, Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania

broke with tradition by refusing to increase military expenditures five percent. He compounded the problem for the U.S.S.R. by announcing his decision in Bucharest two days later and stating that he would raise wages instead. Nor did Ceausescu's name appear on a WTO statement that condemned the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks.

Despite such open disagreement, the Romanian defense minister subsequently attended a meeting with his counterparts in East Berlin. The usual, uninformative communiqué stated that the committee

had discussed questions relating to the status and current activity of the Joint Armed Forces and adopted appropriate decisions . . . in a friendly atmosphere, in the spirit of mutual understanding.³

Each year, Soviet troops stationed in territories of four of the East European states, participate in joint maneuvers with the armed forces of their host countries. Exercises code named "Friendship 79," involving 26,000 men, were held in the western regions of Czechoslovakia that border on the Federal Republic of Germany in February. They reportedly included live infantry, artillery and tank fire, with the enemy (NATO) using simulated "weapons of mass destruction." Chemical warfare units from the Central Group of Soviet Forces decontaminated their own and Czechoslovak troops.⁴

The following month, the Northern Group of the Soviet army in East Europe conducted war games with Polish troops in the Pomeranian military district that faces the Baltic Sea coast. The defense minister of Poland and the Russian general representing the WTO commander-in-chief were present.⁵ No other details were broadcast.

Finally, more extensive spring maneuvers code named "Shield-79" took place in Hungary, where the Southern Group of Soviet Forces is located. At their conclusion, Warsaw Pact commanding officer and Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor G. Kulikov addressed a rally of participants from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania, as well as the Soviet Union and Poland. He criticized Westerners who foment tension and attacked the hegemonistic aspirations of the Chinese Communists.⁶

¹See R. F. Staar, "Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe," *Current History*, vol. 74, no. 436 (April, 1978), pp. 145-149 and 184-185, which covers military, economic and political developments.

²Moscow radio, November 23, 1978.

³*Ibid.*, December 7, 1978.

⁴*Rudé pravo* (Prague), February 6, 1979; *Pravda* (Bratislava), February 7, 1979.

⁵Warsaw radio, March 24, 1979.

⁶*Népszabadság* (Budapest), May 20, 1979.

The day before, Tass had revealed that no Romanian troops were involved with the "Shield-79" exercise, but only staff officers. Over the past ten years, this has been the pattern, with Ceausescu refusing to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers inside or his armed forces to maneuver outside his country. In May, 1969, the last time Romanian troops maneuvered outside the country, they joined with Soviet troops in the U.S.S.R.'s Moldavia (part of Romania before 1945).

If the military situation creates a problem vis-à-vis one country, the well-established practice of central planning, concentration on heavy industry, and trade based on barter agreements have aggravated economic decline bloc-wide. Growth rates for 1977 dropped to 3.2 percent, because of difficulties in procuring natural resources and manpower, not to mention agriculture. Only three of the East European states (Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia) plan to export grain by 1980. Other bloc countries will continue to import it.⁷

With the exception of Poland (coal, copper, sulphur) and Romania (which produces half its petroleum requirements), East Europe imports most basic raw materials from the U.S.S.R. During 1979, Moscow will supply the bloc with 75 to 80 percent of its iron ore and 70 to 75 percent of its petroleum needs (with the exception of Romania which receives none) at prices for oil still 20 percent below OPEC (Or-

ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) levels. The crunch will come before 1985, if Soviet oil production drops as predicted.⁸

When opening Czechoslovakia's first nuclear power plant, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin called on members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) for "strict measures to economize on oil and natural gas" and asked them to "limit their use of fuel."⁹ Bloc plans envisage joint financing (by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union) of two nuclear power plants on Soviet territory. Half the output will go to the East European partners, after the first of these installations has been completed in 1984.¹⁰

This "interested party" approach has been accepted by Moscow in the expectation that other CMEA member states will follow. During the period 1981-1990, the largest share of the joint investments will finance the development of energy and raw materials in the Soviet Union. These projects include the construction of natural gas pipelines and exploitation of new oil fields. Kosygin announced that the Soviet Union will provide 20 percent more fuel and energy resources to other CMEA members during the next five year plan, 1981-1985, a target that Western analysts do not believe is attainable.¹¹

Kosygin's speech took place at the thirtieth anniversary meeting of CMEA, held in June, 1979, in Moscow and attended by the Premiers of member states. Agreements were concluded on modernization of two highways from Moscow through Warsaw to Berlin and Moscow-Bucharest-Sofia; the joint operation of certain air routes; the construction of wide-gauge railroad spurs from the U.S.S.R. into Czechoslovakia (Kosice), Romania (Galati), Poland (Katowice); and the coordination of the 1981-1985 national economic plan.¹²

Another problem shared by the Soviet Union and East Europe involves future manpower shortages.¹³ Hungary currently has a zero population growth rate, and the East Germans actually have declined in number over the past decade. Urbanization is the cause for much of this shortage, with the result that traditional sources of additional labor (women and farmers) are all but exhausted. Low productivity compounds the difficulty, and frequent shortages of consumer goods tend to kill incentive.¹⁴

Attempts at economic reform, i.e., the transfer of decision-making to individual enterprises, were stopped in Czechoslovakia after the August, 1968, invasion and the subsequent occupation by Soviet troops, but they have continued in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland. Most East European members of CMEA allow Western investment and actively seek credits from the West. The bloc's debt¹⁵ has risen to more than \$54 billion, the largest amounts currently being owed by the Soviet Union (\$16.2 billion) and

⁷William H. Luers, "An Overview of Eastern Europe," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 78, no. 2020 (November, 1978), p. 36; Thomas A. Vankai, *Progress and Outlook for East European Agriculture, 1976-80* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, September, 1978), p. 4.

⁸*Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), June 4, 1979. The average price for Soviet oil is expected to increase by 38 percent this year, according to *The New York Times*, July 22, 1979. The CIA prediction is cited by John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark, "Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf," *Issue Brief* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, July 17, 1979), p. 2.

⁹Quoted by the *Wall Street Journal*, July 6, 1979.

¹⁰Prague radio, March 29, 1979. Construction of nuclear power stations "in several hundred [Soviet] population centers" will be justified by 1990, according to Moscow radio, June 25, 1979. At about the same time, the European members of CMEA and Cuba plan to have increased their nuclear power output to 37 million installed kilowatts. *Ibid.*, July 1, 1979.

¹¹*Pravda* (Moscow), June 27, 1979. He also stated that CMEA members will have received 370 million tons of oil, another 46 million tons of petroleum products, some 88 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and 64 billion KW hours of electricity during 1976-1980.

¹²Communiqué in *ibid.*, June 30, 1979. It is of interest to note that Angola, Afghanistan, Iraq, South Yemen, Laos, Mozambique, Mexico, Finland, and Ethiopia all sent observers to this meeting.

¹³Nora Beloff, "Labor Crunch in the Worker Paradise," *Washington Post*, August 20, 1978.

¹⁴Luers, *op. cit.*, in note 7 above.

¹⁵According to West German sources, cited by Reuters, in *The New York Times*, February 24, 1979; *The Economist* (London), March 24, 1979.

TABLE 1: Soviet Trade with East Europe
(in millions of rubles*)

Country	1976	1977	1978
Albania	none	none	none
Bulgaria	4,465.5 (7.9)	5,153.3 (8.1)	6,141.8 (8.7)
Czechoslovakia	4,543.3 (8.0)	5,117.3 (8.1)	6,060.6 (8.6)
East Germany	5,997.2 (10.6)	6,727.5 (10.6)	7,693.0 (11.0)
Hungary	3,492.1 (6.1)	4,026.6 (6.4)	4,823.3 (6.9)
Poland	5,235.0 (9.2)	6,068.0 (9.6)	7,049.6 (10.0)
Romania	1,599.9 (2.8)	2,025.4 (3.2)	1,950.3 (2.8)
Yugoslavia	1,821.1 (3.2)	2,045.6 (3.2)	2,178.0 (3.1)
Sub-totals	27,154.1 (47.8)	31,163.7 (49.2)	35,896.6 (51.0)
Total U.S.S.R. trade	56,753.0 (100.0)	63,348.1 (100.0)	70,195.5 (100.0)

Sources: Ministerstvo Vneshnei Torgovli, *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1977 g.* (Moscow: Statistika, 1978), pp. 9-10 and 15; *Vneshnyaya torgovlya* (April, 1979), insert.

*Note: Percentages of total Soviet trade given in parentheses.

TABLE 2: Communist Military Agreements Concluded and Weapons Deliveries to Less Developed Countries
(in millions of dollars)

Years	U.S.S.R.		Eastern Europe	
	Agreements concluded	Deliveries	Agreements concluded	Deliveries
1954-1967	5,040	4,075	755	685
1968-1977	21,010	16,960	1,665	1,445
Totals	26,050	21,035	2,420	2,130

Source: CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1978* (Washington, D.C., October, 1978), p. 73.

Poland (\$15.5 billion). Paying the annual interest alone represents a substantial burden on the states concerned.

Despite difficulties, trade between the CMEA states and the Soviet Union ranges between a low of 42 percent in the case of Romania and a high of 78 percent for Bulgaria. (See Table 1.) An interesting aspect of the bloc's commercial relations with the West is the conduit form some of them take. For example, the Soviet Union receives high-speed computer printers for its armed forces made in Hungary, with transistors and other components purchased for hard currency or on credit by Hungary in the United States and other capitalist countries.¹⁶

THIRD WORLD ACTIVITIES

Imports of fuel and raw materials from the less developed countries (LDC's) during 1981-1985 will be paid for with complete industrial plants from East Europe. In effect, this amounts to reversing the "buy-back" arrangement used by the bloc in trade with the

West. It may not work, however, if the third world states follow the example recently set by Iran, which accepts only convertible currency for its petroleum.¹⁷

Although the Middle East is included in the plans for trade with the LDC's, the CMEA effort has so far centered on Africa. Even here, the East Europeans and the Soviets have discovered that, despite their financial instability, most LDC's will not accept inferior goods. Nevertheless, from 1954 through 1977, the African countries have drawn about \$10 billion in credits from the Soviet Union (\$7,150,000) and East Europe (\$2,885,000).¹⁸ More than half went to the North African states of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

The military aspect of relations with the LDC's has included arms exports, the training of third world nationals, and the dispatch of advisers. Almost two-thirds (61 percent) of the Soviet and almost one-half (48 percent) of the East European weapons shipments have been delivered during the past five years.¹⁹ (See Table 2 for the overall figures.) This coincides with the expansion of Soviet influence in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan.

Apart from arms, during the same 24-year period shown in Table 2, the number of military trainees from all the participating LDC's has totaled 41,875 in the U.S.S.R. and 5,100 in East Europe.²⁰ Among the latter, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) lead in supplying weapons and training military personnel for regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Arms from Czechoslo-

¹⁶The New York Times, May 16, 1979.

¹⁷Harry G. Trend, "Comecon Joint Investments in the Third World," *RAD Background Report* (March 9, 1979); Munich.

¹⁸Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1978* (Washington, D.C.: October, 1978), p. 78, gives detailed figures.

¹⁹William F. Robinson, "Eastern Europe's Presence in Black Africa," *RAD Background Report* (June 21, 1979), p. 5.

²⁰CIA, *op. cit.*, in note 18 above.

vakia have been received by both Nigeria (Biafra) and Ethiopia (Eritrea) during civil wars in those countries, in an apparent attempt to back the winners.

East Germany's armed forces weekly *Volksarmee* published a rhyme to the effect that "Kalashnikoffs [AK-47 automatic assault rifles] not Coca-Cola bring self-determination to Angola."²¹ It is known that East German experts have established security and communications systems and have provided training for combat and local police forces in Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia and Mozambique.

During early 1979, East German party and state leader Erich Honecker visited Angola, Zambia and Mozambique to sign friendship treaties with each of those governments. He revealed that the GDR would donate \$2-million worth of "solidarity goods" for the so-called patriotic front guerrillas who were attempting to overthrow the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government.²² No definition of "goods" was given, but it is assumed that they will include weapons.

The Soviet Union's "Afrika Korps" of some 9,000 East German military and civilian advisers also functions in the Middle East. It operates three camps for Palestinian terrorists in South Yemen and trains security forces.²³ Leaders from the so-called national liberation movements, who request it, receive advanced training in the GDR.

Politically, some of East Europe's leaders have been visiting Africa rather frequently. Ceausescu holds the record, with six trips through mid-1979; Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria has made two visits; Honecker's, visit has already been mentioned. Romania leads in the number of friendship and cooperation treaties signed with African states (seven), followed by Bulgaria and the GDR (two each), with Czechoslovakia and Poland (one each) next, and no treaty yet from Hungary.²⁴ Interparty agreements have been signed with African ruling movements, and guerrilla groups in southern Africa have their foreign headquarters in East Berlin.

Approximately 60 million Roman Catholics in East Europe were moved by Pope John Paul II, the former

Karol Cardinal Wojtyla, when he visited his native Poland in mid-1979. He spoke about the Christian traditions of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Serbia, and voiced distress that in time of "declared freedom and exchange of information" (obviously referring to the 1975 Helsinki agreement) there might be East Europeans who could not hear him speak.²⁵

Nine out of ten Poles are Catholic; in Hungary, the percentage is two-thirds of the population; in Czechoslovakia, barely half; in Bulgaria, East Germany and Romania, about ten percent each. But only Yugoslavia, with almost one-third of her population professing Roman Catholicism, maintains diplomatic relations with the Vatican.²⁶ Czechoslovakia alone follows an openly repressive religious policy, following the example of an atheistic Soviet Union that persecutes its seven million Catholics in areas bordering East Europe.

East Europeans of German ethnic origin have an opportunity to emigrate because of agreements made by the Federal Republic with their respective governments. About 20,000 were repatriated in 1975; the total increased to 70,153 during 1978. The largest numbers came from Poland (36,100), Romania and the GDR/East Berlin (12,118 each), and the Soviet Union (8,454).²⁷ In the case of Poland, the current five year program will expire in 1980, by which time almost 125,000 ethnic Germans will have been allowed to leave in exchange for \$900 million in economic aid.

On the other hand, East Germany continues to police a 500-yard death strip along its border with the Federal Republic. It includes steel, concrete and wooden fencing; trenches and other obstacles to stop vehicles; an estimated one million land mines; almost 35,000 automatically activated self-firing machine guns; about 1,000 guard dogs and the same number of bunkers plus 675 watchtowers. Only 186 East Germans escaped last year; others were killed in the attempt.²⁸ On June 28, 1979, the GDR drastically increased penalties for espionage, anti-government incitement and other security offenses.

That same day an amendment to the electoral law gave the franchise directly to inhabitants of East Berlin, violating the 1971 four-power agreement on that divided city. France, Great Britain and the United States immediately protested this unilateral East German action to the Soviet Union.²⁹ It is more than probable that the U.S.S.R. had agreed in advance to the East German move, which made the eastern part of Berlin the de jure capital that it had been in fact for many years.

In July, 1979, East Berlin hosted a meeting of all bloc party secretaries in charge of ideology. Soviet delegation leader Boris Ponomarev stated that the danger of war still emanates "from aggressive circles of imperialism and their main tool—NATO." The

²¹Cited by Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 7, in note 19 above. The Ethiopian foreign minister is quoted as saying that the GDR renders valuable assistance to the "patriotic front of Zimbabwe as well as the patriots of Namibia and South Africa." East Berlin radio, July 11, 1979.

²²Tass communiqué of February 22, 1979.

²³Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 9, in note 19 above.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁵*The New York Times*, June 4, 1979.

²⁶*Ibid.*, December 31, 1978. See also "Religion under Real Socialism," *RAD Background Report* (May 31, 1979), p. 33.

²⁷*Die Welt* (Hamburg), January 3, 1979.

²⁸Report of the interior minister, Federal Republic of Germany; cited by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 23, 1979.

²⁹*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), June 29, 1979; *Christian Science Monitor*, July 2, 1979.

concluding announcement thanked Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev for his personal preparation and for the successful conclusion of SALT II. It called for

intensive ideological activities in order to establish clearly in the minds of the public of *all countries* that it is the militaristic circles of NATO which are responsible for the imperialist arms race. . . .³⁰

SUCCESSION PROBLEMS

The current leaders of the Soviet Union and the eight countries of East Europe average 75 years in age; the youngest is Ceaușescu (61) in Romania and the oldest is Josip Broz-Tito (87) in Yugoslavia.* Within the next decade, every one of these individuals will probably have been replaced, which may lead to change.³¹ The transitions could even affect the nature of the Soviet Union's control over its client states.

The most important development for the bloc, of course, will take place in Moscow. Leonid Brezhnev has not designated a successor, because the heir apparent might become impatient and attempt to remove him. He remembers the circumstances under which his predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev, was ousted from office in 1964 as a result of a conspiracy that Brezhnev himself organized.

Speculation about the next Soviet leader has recently concentrated on Konstantin Chernenko, who is 68 years old and has spent his entire adult life as a professional apparatus worker for the Communist party.³² His acquaintance with Brezhnev dates back to 1950, when both men held assignments in Moldavia. Not much is known about the personality of Chernenko, although Brezhnev took him to the summit meeting with United States President Jimmy Carter in mid-June, 1979, in Vienna.

Chernenko has not had any other foreign experience; most of his career has involved agitprop and, more recently, the coordination of Politburo work. Supervising agitation and propaganda in Moldavia and the mass agitation section of the agitprop department in the Central Committee apparatus in Moscow³³ hardly indicates that Chernenko would have a

liberal outlook. The opposite is far more likely.

As far as East Europe is concerned, a change in Soviet leadership may lead to more ideological rigidity, barriers to contact with the West, orthodoxy in economic life and a crackdown on dissent, stifling developments toward a more relaxed atmosphere throughout the bloc.

It might be unrealistic, under these circumstances, to expect any leadership changes in East Europe as a result of popular pressure like those that took place in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and twice in Poland (1956 and 1970).³⁴ Instead, the aging leadership will precipitate succession crises.

Yugoslavia's President Tito, although the oldest of the East European leaders, may not be the first to leave the scene. His heir-apparent, Edward Kardelj, died on February 19, 1979. The collective leadership that has been set up to succeed Tito must be nervous about future Soviet policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. Brezhnev himself pressured Tito on several occasions to provide the Soviet Union with base rights and, in general, to move closer to the bloc's military alliance. None of the Yugoslav leaders have forgotten about "Operation Polarka," the Soviet contingency plan for the occupation of their country after the death of Tito.³⁵ However, Tito visited Moscow during May 16-21, 1979, probably to discuss the scheduled September, 1979, nonaligned summit meeting in Havana.

The other special case is Albania, which belongs neither to CMEA nor to the Warsaw Pact. Her orthodox Stalinist regime precipitated a break in relations with Moscow in 1961 and with Beijing in 1978, accusing both countries of selling out to United States imperialism. Enver Hoxha, Albania's leader since the Communist party was established in his country, has been able to purge all potential challengers.³⁶ Despite frequent Soviet overtures to normalize relations, the Albanians have been adamant in their refusal to do so.

Apparently all the East European leaders dependent upon the Soviet Union are waiting to see what happens in the Kremlin. The struggle for power may be protracted and the Soviet Union's grip on its client

(Continued on page 136)

*See *Current History*, vol. 74, no. 436 (April, 1978), table 3, p. 149.

³⁰East Berlin radio, July 5 and 6, 1979; italics added.

³¹Charles András, "Eastern Europe Will Also Have Succession Problems," *RAD Background Report* (May 17, 1979).

³²His biography appears in R.F. Staar (ed.), *1979 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 450.

³³*Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, vol. 29 (Moscow, 1978), 3d ed., p. 84.

³⁴András, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10, in note 31 above.

³⁵Martin Schiller, *Operation Polarka* (Zürich: Schweizerische Aktion für Menschenrechte, 1974), p. 26.

³⁶Peter R. Prifti, *Socialist Albania since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 311.

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"From the African point of view, the Soviet transition from revolutionary to imperialist ambition means that Soviet interests become negotiable. A true revolutionary never negotiates, since the future is all or nothing; today, Soviet foreign policy is becoming more tentative."

Soviet Policies in Africa

BY RICHARD BISSELL

Managing Editor, ORBIS

THE most noticeable interest of the Soviet Union in Africa is the disruption of the political and economic system established by the European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After World War II, it was assumed that the United States would inherit the European role in Africa, but the United States refusal to assume the imperialist mantle resulted in an attenuated conflict between Soviet revolutionary policies in Africa and the traditional Western European presence.¹ American involvement has increased gradually and reluctantly; the European presence in Africa has remained the primary target of Soviet revolutionary tactics to the present day.

The primary agents for the Soviet subversion of European interests in Africa have been the Soviet secret police (KGB).² The international Communist movement has been largely ineffectual in Africa because of the weakness of indigenous Communist parties; where the Soviet Union gained a foothold in the pre-1974 period, the KGB was probably the dominant instrument; Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Congo-Brazzaville are most prominent. KGB activities consisted primarily of providing personal protection for political leaders, like Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's Sekou Toure, organizing security ser-

vices to intimidate the standing military forces and educating younger members of the elites in Soviet schools in an effort to wean them away from Western models of progress. The flexibility and ruthlessness of the KGB were ideal characteristics for an operating arm of foreign policy that had to move into and out of countries on the whims of unpredictable leaders, to undertake protective action without the interminable delays characteristic of ordinary Soviet bureaucrats, and to utilize selective violence in an environment where politics was ruled by an elite.

The KGB's experience in the use of disinformation was also ideal in the newly independent African states, where government was conducted primarily by rumor; planting the idea of an impending demotion in the ear of a barracks lieutenant could be the pretext for changing the government in many West African countries.³ The instability of the 1960's ensured that Africa would remain in the KGB bailiwick (in Soviet bureaucratic planning), for no sensible line bureaucrat would dare venture into such turbulent territory.

Aside from a few efforts predating the fall of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, there were no serious attempts to "build socialism" in Africa before 1974. From a Soviet perspective, there is little use in attempting to create a socialist evolution in Africa. The transition must take the form it did in Ethiopia, where the old order was destroyed through revolution and a bloody combat, from which a people's revolution might emerge. The role of the KGB is central in creating the conditions ripe for revolution, in preventing the growth of economic prosperity in Africa that might provide for a peaceful evolution of the region.⁴ This explains the paucity of Soviet economic aid to Africa, said to total about \$750 million between 1954 and 1977. The Soviet Union could afford to provide more aid, but it would not serve its purposes: the international economic system remains dominated by the West, and providing aid to the African states would strengthen a system constructed and controlled by the West. The Soviet Union thus found Idi Amin of Uganda a useful ally, not for his policies, but as a "bull in a china shop" the Soviet Union could not afford to buy, and would therefore like to destroy.

The revolutionary thrust of Soviet foreign policy is

¹Robert Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 56, 1977, p. 53.

²Operations of the KGB, needless to say, are difficult to document. One can get an operational sense of the organization from books such as John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978); John Barron, *KGB* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976).

³When the KGB tried the same trick in Zambia in early 1978, Kaunda was so upset he was on the verge of expelling the Soviet Ambassador. Instead, Kaunda chose to limit Soviet influence in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian situation.

⁴Robert Legvold, *op. cit.*, p. 62, makes this point with regard to Soviet perspectives on the new international economic order: "But for the Soviet Union the North-South emphasis is misconceived, not merely because this tends to feature a 'rich-poor' dichotomy, and the Soviet Union does not like its own ranking, but because a rich-poor dichotomy makes the issue income redistribution, and income redistribution has to do with buying off the oppressed, not revolutionizing the system. Properly conceived, the struggle over a new international economic order is between the two social systems, with the socialist countries in the forefront."

most apparent in the rhetoric applied to southern Africa. South Africa's strategic importance to the United States and West Europe for its minerals and location on the Cape Sea Route make it a natural target for the Soviet Union. Soviet policy in Africa is highly reactive to Western concerns. The Soviets become involved when Americans are present, and they become involved when Americans are not present. In the latter case, however, the revolutionary rhetoric is absent (Soviet voices do not call for the overthrow of Emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa or Sekou Toure, even in their most despotic moments).

The role of the Soviet Union in southern Africa, after all, has been primarily rhetorical: a condemnation of the alleged South African plans for a nuclear test in August, 1977; calls for international sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia (coincidentally the principal rivals to the Soviet Union in the gold, diamond, and chrome markets); and calls for armed solutions to the political problems of the region. Yet the material contribution of the Soviet Union to solving the conflicts has consisted primarily of a few small weapons to keep the situation unstable: carbines, machine guns, and small land mines to keep the terrorist movements alive. Even in "liberated territories," it is not the Soviet Union which has provided the tools of civil administration. The Scandinavians, the Chinese, the Western socialists and Americans have provided medicines, schoolbooks, agricultural help—as in Mozambique when Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Front, contested Portuguese rule.

In every generation of Soviet leadership, however, there is a moment of revolutionary commitment to an African nation when the Soviet leadership loses its sense of its own limitations and decides that the time has come for a true alliance with what appears to be a budding African revolution. In recent years, that event occurred again in Ethiopia. In what appears to have been a move to overrule the Soviet military (who wanted to keep the bases in Somalia), the Soviet leadership decided to undertake a very visible, total commitment to the survival of the Mengistu Haile Mariam government in Ethiopia.

In its desire to act as godfather to African socialism, the Soviet Union saw in Mengistu sufficient justification to jeopardize its investment in Somalia (which it then lost), despite the clearly shaky position of the Mengistu government. With its massive airlift of military supplies, the Soviet Union committed itself to Ethiopia, violating the airspace of many countries along the way and enhancing the position of those in the West who argued for greater preparedness against the Russian bear advancing into Africa. The shift to

Ethiopia was not without its strategic advantages (Ethiopia is larger than Somalia and much richer, with excellent Red Sea ports and the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], which affects African rhetorical policies), but the support of Ethiopia was still a revolutionary commitment.

More than any other African country, Ethiopia had a recognizable class system with a nobility, a clergy, a bourgeoisie and an enormous peasant class, and the revolution that occurred in the wake of the Emperor's overthrow was as thorough a Marxist revolution as has been seen in the African continent. Whether the Ethiopian revolution will continue along the course dictated by Leninist scripture even with the guidance of Soviet and Cuban advisers is unclear. In any case, the revolutionary flame, buried for so long in the Soviet core-empire of East Europe, occasionally bursts forth when it is sparked by an exotic environment. Revolution in Africa is generally interpreted as the destruction of capitalist-oriented governments; only once in a long while does it emerge as a serious attempt to build socialism with the full commitment of Soviet resources.

THE EMPIRE BUILDERS

While the Soviet revolutionary tradition in Africa has much to build on, there is a new song in the wind that sounds distinctly different from the *Internationale*. Some Soviet policymakers call not for revolution and disruption but rather for influence and regularization. Influential Soviet leaders argue for working with existing power centers. The Soviet empire builders are leaving their tracks in Africa, and in recent years there is abundant evidence of their existence. Somewhat more speculative, however, is the reason for their emergence.

The first change in the Soviet condition has been the development of a capability to construct an empire, that is, the growth of the Soviet projection of power.⁵ Soviet leaders are willing to deal with other states, whether Western or African, in terms of the currency of power; this suggests that they have already compromised their position on ideology. This compromise has been clearly at work in domestic Soviet policies and in Soviet policies toward neighboring states. The important shift has been in Soviet African policy, long the realm of ideologues, which is increasingly influenced by Soviet practitioners of realpolitik.

An additional aspect of this change in capability has been the building of a domestic industrial and military base. The Soviet Union spent many years deprecating manipulative Western elites who monopolized power projection into Africa. After fighting the West so long with words, the Soviet Union has apparently joined the West in developing an essential military capability, seen in the Angolan supply opera-

⁵See, for instance, W. Scott Thompson, "The Projection of Soviet Power," in *Defending America* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 22-37.

tion of 1974-1975, and, most dramatically, in the Ethiopian war of 1977-1978, with an arms airlift of enormous proportions from bases in Libya, East Europe, and the Soviet Union itself. The ability to move a great deal of heavy equipment—tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and troops—thousands of miles to aid a beleaguered ally was an act and a gesture. Ethiopia survived the Somali attack. And the Soviet Union demonstrated its ability to project power.

In terms of the tools of empire, the nature of Soviet influence has changed remarkably over the last 10 years. Traditional views of geopolitics have been applied to Africa. The activity of the Soviet navy has taken several leaps.⁶ During the period 1968-1972, the navy undertook regular operations in the northwest Indian Ocean and around the coast of West Africa. There was essentially no naval movement, however, below the equator. After 1975, patrols were extended and intelligence ships were stationed as far down the coast as the South Africans left open. The use of Angolan and Mozambican ports for resupplying the Soviet squadrons in the area was essential for that extension of Soviet power.

The second movement, into the lower parts of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, threw suspicion on the explanation that Soviet naval activity was defensive in nature, i.e., that the Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean related only to the stationing of Polaris-equipped American submarines in that region. This may have motivated the first Soviet move into the region, but Soviet involvement in southern Africa suggested that a broader purpose of influence building was involved.

The role of the Soviet navy highlights the Soviet approach to empire-building, namely, the low-risk options generally chosen. Soviet leaders do not expose their nationals to war situations in the third world: witness the evacuation of Soviet personnel from Egypt on the eve of the 1973 war. Soviet leaders do not want to have their forces pinned down on land, where they would become pawns in a conflict that they do not control. The Soviet navy is an ideal tool for projecting power, and emphasis can be placed on the Soviet Union's ability to remove the tools of influence quickly. In Somalia, for instance, one of the most important installations built by the Soviet Union was a floating drydock—which could be conveniently towed across the Gulf of Aden when relations with the Somali government deteriorated.

At the same time, any competent empire builder knows that a land element is eventually needed; thus

⁶Michael McGwire and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, 1977).

⁷For a non-African example, see Richard E. Bissell, "Soviet Use of Proxies in the Third World: the Case of Yemen," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 30, January, 1978, pp. 87-106.

the critical role played by proxy forces in Soviet planning.⁷ In Africa, perhaps the most unstable environment for Soviet commitments, a variety of Soviet proxies have been at work, and the number of Soviet personnel on land has been extraordinarily small. The Cuban contribution has been widely noted, although the actual estimates as of 1979 vary considerably: 10,000-20,000 in Angola, 8,000-15,000 in Ethiopia, 2,000-5,000 in other African countries like Congo, Guinea and Algeria. Cubans have been deployed extensively as pilots for African countries that lack the personnel trained to operate Soviet-manufactured MiG's. In 1978, Soviet pilots were dispatched to Cuba to cover Cuban air space, since most trained Cuban pilots had been sent to Africa. For the Soviet Union, this move made sense: there was far less risk of an outbreak of war in Cuba than in any African state.

Of equal importance is the contribution of East European countries. The closest Soviet clients, East Germany and Bulgaria, have sent technical personnel to Africa to carry out land-based missions, in many cases staffing the ministries just as the French inserted conseillers to control African ministries. The Soviet Union has discovered an ability to generate many traditional tools of empire.

Soviet performance has not paralleled that of the West in the field of economics. The African countries appear, by and large, to prefer Western economic links—presumably because of the higher quality of Western goods and the availability of Western capital virtually without limit. The Soviet Union offers little economic aid; and the Africans appear to seek very little economic aid from the Communist states, which can only be spent in Communist countries.

There has been tremendous Soviet activity in the field of fishing. There are several reasons for this: (1) the growing need for protein in the Soviet Union; (2) the comparative cost advantage of Soviet fishing fleets in the world market, which allows them to catch and sell fish in distant waters for the profit of the Soviet Union; (3) the military purposes of the fishing fleets, with a number of ships devoted to intelligence gathering and monitoring while on the high seas; (4) the port infrastructures required to maintain the fleets, which allows the Soviet Union to place personnel in port cities all around Africa. The fur trappers of the American north and west, the European spice traders of Southeast Asia, and the ivory seekers of Africa taught that empires can be built on trading posts; in fishing, the Soviet policymakers appear to have found an economic tool that provides them with the access they want, usually without assuming the responsibility for law and order that frequently follows the establishment of trading posts.

A second central question with regard to Soviet imperialism is the *willingness* of the Soviet leadership to use the capabilities for projecting power. In the

1960's, the Soviet Union took few initiatives in establishing relations. The trip taken by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny in the spring of 1977 through a number of African countries, however, marked a turning point. Podgorny certainly did not captivate many audiences, nor did he break entirely new strategic ground; but he was part of the Soviet intention of showing the flag in Africa. The global awareness of the extensive Soviet presence in Africa emerged dramatically after Soviet intervention in the Angolan civil war, which boosted Soviet self-confidence tremendously.

The basic infrastructure of penetration, both diplomatic and commercial, was already established. In Benin, for example, there are only 11 resident ambassadors, and one of them is from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also has resident ambassadors in Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Empire and Chad, to name a few of the less active diplomatic centers of Africa. The creation of embassies ensures that action can be initiated by Soviet representatives in the field as well as by opportunities presented by African leaders visiting Moscow.

The Soviet Union has also shown a greater willingness to commit its military resources to African conflicts in the last few years. The Angolan campaign, which appeared to be a series of tentative steps—each dependent upon the American reaction to the previous step—established a distance record for the Soviet projection of power. Thereafter, the Soviet Union took a more active role in Africa. By January, 1978, the Soviet military felt confident enough to undertake the major airlift and sealift of supplies to Ethiopia. The timing of the Soviet move is important: the Soviet Union did not undertake the massive support of Ethiopia until the political storm of major power realignment in the Horn was completed. In the summer of 1977, the United States danced with the Somalis and then withdrew after the invasion of Ethiopia. The Soviet military move did not occur until all political hazards had been removed, i.e., the United States had ruled out force on its part and had discouraged all likely proxies (Iran, Saudi Arabia) from active intervention.

An additional index of Soviet willingness to project power into the African environment is the level and background of personnel involved in designing Soviet policies. The dispatch of top-rank Soviet generals to Angola and Ethiopia to provide leadership has been one sign; a military gathering in Addis Ababa in mid-January, 1978, included General Koliyakov (Soviet chief of staff in Libya) as well as Cuba's Defense Minister Raul Castro. Soviet proxies, like Cuba, have

shown an equal zeal: Cuban Premier Fidel Castro used to "stay in the general staff command room as long as 14 hours at a stretch" to follow the Angolan campaign.⁸ Both images suggest the intense commitment of resources by the Communist allies intervening in African wars.

At the same time, there has been a significant turnover of personnel at the Africa Institute in Moscow. In 1976, Vassily Solodovnikov was dispatched to become Ambassador to Zambia (a very influential post given the Soviet bet that Joshua Nkomo would be the leader of post-civil war Zimbabwe-Rhodesia), and was replaced by Anatoly Gromyko, the son of the Soviet Foreign Minister. Much of the staff at the Africa Institute now emerging at senior levels (P. Belayev, L.V. Goncharov, G.B. Stanishenko, S.G. Vydrin, among others) have had little academic output; their roles at the institute are evidently tied to policy-related work. With the movement from a revolutionary emphasis to the running of an empire, Soviet research personnel have less time for the academic analysis of political and social trends and must devote more time to the mechanics of manipulating power.

The Soviet Union's willingness to use economic tools in its African policy is remarkably restricted. The projects chosen for support and the commodities chosen for trading are only those high-priority items that the Soviet Union must divert resources to obtain. The largest loans made to African countries are for the development of extractive resources that are then bartered to the Soviet Union in repayment. The 1969 agreement with Guinea resulted in the shipment of two million tons of bauxite to the Soviet Union each year (scheduled to last 30 years). In 1969, Guinea was a Soviet client state, and the Soviet Union was not self-sufficient in bauxite.⁹ Similar patterns emerged in the 1977 agreement with Morocco to develop phosphate deposits and the 1976 Soviet offer of \$290 million to Algeria for bauxite production. A universal complaint with regard to the West European colonial powers was the charge that they exploited the colonies for raw materials; evidently the Soviet Union now finds profit in the same pattern.

FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION

Emphasis in the allocation of Soviet personnel and resources is shifting. The influence of bureaucratic elements (both civilian and military) has been growing to ensure that Soviet policies in Africa are increasingly tailored to the domestic needs of the Soviet

(Continued on page 135)

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⁸Gabriel Garcia Marquez, "Castro in the War Room: Tactical Advice to Angola," *Washington Post*, January 11, 1977.

⁹IISS, *Strategic Survey 1977*, p. 66.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

HOW THE SOVIET UNION IS GOVERNED. *By Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. 679 pages, notes, tables and index, \$18.50.)

Jerry Hough has completely updated and revised Merle Fainsod's 1963 work on the governing of the Soviet Union. He has rearranged the material in chronological order and has added new chapters to explain the distribution of power in the Soviet Union and the interrelationships of Soviet policy institutions to show "how policy is formed," using sources not available when the book appeared in 1963.

Fainsod was interested in how the Soviet system "was maintained, and the politics that revolved around that process." Hough has changed the emphasis, saying that "given the existence of the system, how are within-system questions decided? Given the ultimate structure of power and the dominance of the party leadership, what is the structure of influence and of responsiveness to social forces?"

Hough believes that in the future there will be a within-the-system evolution to "some liberalization and Westernization"; the choosing of a successor to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev will pose many problems for the future of the Soviet Union.

O.E.S.

USSR FACTS & FIGURES ANNUAL. *By John L. Scherer.* (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1979. 309 pages, \$38.50.)

This volume compiled by John Scherer is a mass of tables, facts and maps about the Soviet Union that should prove invaluable to a student of Soviet affairs.

O.E.S.

SOVIET BARGAINING BEHAVIOR: THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN CASE. *By Christer Jönsson.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. 366 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$13.50.)

Swedish university professor Christer Jönsson examines the 1958-1963 nuclear test ban negotiations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States which ended with the signing of a treaty on August 5, 1963 (the Moscow Treaty). He examines the negotiations in terms of "U.S.-Soviet interaction, the possible effect of Sino-Soviet bargaining," and the actual "Soviet conduct at Geneva." It is interesting to have the views of a non-American.

O.E.S.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: U.S.—SOVIET RELATIONS FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. *By Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979. 301 pages, notes and index, \$12.95.)

This book is part of a University of Chicago Press series on foreign views of the United States. The Soviet historians who wrote this offer many interesting points of view for the American student.

O.E.S.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE. *Edited by George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein.* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978. 295 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$20.00.)

This useful collection of essays examines Soviet policy toward West Germany, France, Britain, Finland, Austria and Scandinavia, to identify continuities and changes in Moscow's policy. There are chapters on the Soviet position toward the MBFR (mutual balanced force reduction) talks and European trade and integration, as well as differing views of the implications of Soviet policy for the United States.

O.E.S.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. *By Morton Schwartz.* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978. 216 pages, works cited and index, \$12.50.)

This timely and useful examination of Soviet perceptions of the United States focuses on the American socioeconomic system, the political system, United States policymakers, and expectations with regard to future United States policy. The study is a clear account of the way Soviet Americanists analyze United States developments for a sophisticated Soviet audience.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: POLICY FORMULATION, 1966-1973. *By Ilana Kass.* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 273 pages, \$18.25.)

By comparing different Soviet newspapers, this scholarly work seeks to identify interest groups in the Soviet hierarchy and their differing views of Middle East developments. The careful treatment accorded to Soviet accounts of key events in the 1966 to 1973 period will interest specialists seeking to understand policymaking in the U.S.S.R.

A.Z.R. ■

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

PRESIDENT CARTER ADDRESSES CONGRESS ON SALT II

On June 18, 1979, in Vienna, President Jimmy Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev signed the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II): that same night, addressing a joint session of Congress, President Carter asked the Senate to ratify the treaty. (For a detailed analysis of the treaty and a glossary of treaty terms see pages 101ff). Excerpts from the President's address to Congress are reprinted here:

SALT II is the most detailed, far-reaching, comprehensive treaty in the history of arms control. Its provisions are interwoven by the give and take of the long negotiating process. Neither side obtained everything it sought. But the package that did emerge is a carefully balanced whole, and it will make the world a safer place for both sides.

The restrictions on strategic nuclear weapons are complex because these weapons represent the highest development of the complicated technical skills of two great nations. But the basic realities underlying this treaty—and the thrust of the treaty itself—are not so complex. When all is said and done, SALT II is a matter of common sense.

The SALT II treaty reduces the danger of nuclear war. For the first time it places equal ceilings on the strategic arsenals of both sides, ending a previous numerical imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union.

SALT II preserves our options to build the forces we need to maintain that strategic balance. The treaty enhances our own ability to monitor what the Soviet Union is doing. And it leads directly to the next step in more effectively controlling nuclear weapons.

Again, SALT II does not end the arms competition, but it does make that competition safer and more predictable, with clear rules and verifiable limits where otherwise there would be no rules and there would be no limits.

It's in our interest because it slows down—it even reverses—the momentum of the Soviet arms buildup that has been of such great concern to all of us.

Under this new treaty, the Soviet Union will be held to a third fewer strategic missile launchers and bombers by 1985 than they would have—simply by continuing to build at their present rate.

With SALT II, the numbers of warheads on missiles, their throwweight, and the qualitative development of new missiles will all be limited. The Soviet Union will have to destroy or dismantle some 250 strategic missile systems—systems such as nuclear submarines armed with relatively new missiles, built in the early 1970's, and aircraft will have to be destroyed by the Soviet Union carrying their largest multimegaton bomb. Once dismantled, under the provisions of SALT II, these systems cannot be replaced.

By contrast, no operational U.S. forces will have to be reduced. For one Soviet missile alone—the SS-18—the SALT II limits will mean that some 6,000 fewer Soviet nuclear warheads can be built and aimed at our country.

SALT II limits severely for the first time the number of warheads that can be mounted on these very large missiles of the Soviet Union, cutting down their actual potential by 6,000.

Without the SALT II limits, the Soviet Union could build so many warheads that any land-based system, fixed or mobile, could be jeopardized.

With SALT II, we can concentrate more effort on preserv-

ing the balance in our own conventional and NATO forces. Without the SALT II treaty, we would be forced to spend extra billions and billions of dollars each year in a dangerous, destabilizing, unnecessary nuclear arms race.

As I have said many times, SALT II is not based on trust. Compliance will be assured by our own nation's means of verification, including extremely sophisticated satellites, powerful electronic systems, and a vast intelligence network. Were the Soviet Union to take the enormous risk of trying to violate this treaty in any way that might affect the strategic balance, there is no doubt that we would discover it in time to respond fully and effectively.

It is the SALT II agreement itself which forbids concealment measures, many of them for the first time, forbids interference with our monitoring, and forbids the encryption or the encoding of crucial missile test information. A violation of this part of the agreement—which we would quickly detect—would be just as serious as a violation of the limits on strategic weapons themselves.

NEED FOR RATIFICATION

The SALT II treaty must be judged on its own merits, and on its own merits it is a substantial gain for national security for us and the people whom we represent, and it is a gain for international stability. But it would be the height of irresponsibility to ignore other possible consequences of a failure to ratify this treaty.

These consequences would include:

- Greatly increased spending for strategic nuclear arms which we do not need;
- Greater uncertainty about the strategic balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union;
- Vastly increased danger of nuclear proliferation among other nations of the world who do not presently have nuclear explosives;
- Increased political tension between the East and the West, with greater likelihood that other inevitable problems would escalate into serious superpower confrontations.

Rejection would also be a damaging blow to the Western alliance. All of our European and other allies, including especially those who are most directly and courageously facing Soviet power, all of them, strongly support SALT II. If the Senate were to reject the treaty, America's leadership of this alliance would be compromised, and the alliance itself would be severely shaken.

In short, SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union. It's a deliberate, calculated move that we are making as a matter of self-interest for the United States—a move that happens to serve the goals of both security and survival, that strengthens both the military position of our own country and the cause of world peace.

And, of course, SALT II is the absolutely indispensable precondition for moving on to much deeper and more significant cuts under SALT III. ■

SALT II AND THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

(Continued from page 105)

tain procedures that would complicate observation by national technical means, and Article XV pledges each side not to interfere with the other's verification procedures. Of course, given the complex technologies involved, verification cannot provide 100 percent assurance to either party. But the more significant types of deception have been mutually identified for the first time, and both the treaty and the Joint Statement of Principles for future negotiations pledge the parties to use the Standing Consultative Commission, which has been in operation since December, 1972. Perhaps not unlike marriage, the treaty rests finally on the mutual recognition that the benefits to be obtained by cheating do not warrant the risks to the trust so carefully constructed in the bilateral relationship.

CHANNELING THE COMPETITION

A final feature of the strategic relationship constructed by the SALT II agreements is that it will actually encourage some kinds of technological competition while restricting others. This feature of the treaty is cited as an argument against the treaty by opponents whose bias is for "disarmament." But the basic objectives of the "disarmers" and "arms controllers" do not mesh, and their arguments do not contribute to constructive discussion. The fundamental premise of arms control is that some kinds of weapon development are less stable than others. That premise combines with the assumption that inevitable political conflict between the superpowers means that both will continue to maintain military forces. The resulting objective for negotiations is to channel arms competition into relatively less dangerous technologies.

Two examples from SALT II illustrate the point. First, the subceiling of 820 MIRVed ICBM's virtually assures that the Soviet Union will "go to sea" with more of its MIRV forces. Although it had only 144 SLBM launchers with MIRV's in the summer of 1979, the treaty permits up to 500 MIRV launchers on submarines and aircraft fitted with ASBM's or ALCM's. The history of Soviet behavior suggests that the Soviet Union will build to reach these ceilings, and the outcome may be increased Soviet development in these two areas.

That result can be defended on two grounds. The United States has invited competition in precisely the areas where its own technological leads are the greatest—an American advantage partially offsetting similar advantages for the Soviet Union in launch and throw-weights of ICBM's. These mobile systems are less vulnerable, therefore they may be more stable in

crisis situations. As accuracy increases on both sides and fixed-site ICBM's become more vulnerable, strategic analysts assume that if each side retains mobile strategic forces capable of an assured second strike neither will be as likely to respond hastily and irrationally during a political crisis.

The second example of the channeling effect in SALT II is found in the "counting rule." By this rule, established in Article II: paragraph 5 and in paragraphs 10 through 12 of Article III, both sides agree not to deploy ICBM's or SLBM's with more warheads than the maximum number tested by either party. That is, for the new "light" ICBM permitted to both parties by Article IV: paragraphs 9 and 11, the maximum number of warheads will be 10. Thus, the United States might be encouraged to build the MX with 10 warheads or the Soviet Union might decide to replace the SS-17's and SS-19's with a new missile carrying 10 RV's. The Soviets might also be encouraged to test their SLBM, currently carrying 7 RV's, with up to 14 RV's, the maximum number tested by either party (the U.S. Poseidon C-3) before May 1, 1979.

The effect of Article III's provision, then, might be to encourage the modernization of either country's forces in a way that will actually increase the number of RV's carried by current missiles or to build the one new missile permitted by paragraph 9 of Article III with the maximum number of RV's permitted. Still, the limits of what can be achieved by either side is known, and each side is assuming the risk that the other might increase the number of RV's up to a predictable number to obtain certainty that it will not undertake entirely new programs with unpredictable quantitative capabilities.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

The focus of the strategic arms talks has been the military balance between the superpowers. For over 20 years, both countries have perceived comparative military power as the center of their national politics and economics. American concern with the "missile gap" in the late 1950's was accentuated by Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's competitive images: that the Soviet Union would "bury" the United States or "surpass" it in one or another category of economic production. Thus, a preoccupation with counting and comparing Soviet and American military forces has produced an international industry of some magnitude and has been deeply rooted in cold war thinking. SALT II originated in and profoundly affects the military balance, and most public discussion of its effects on the strategic balance has been too narrow. On one hand, it is charged that the SALT talks have legitimized the arms race; on the other, critics declare that the negotiations themselves are responsible for what is perceived to be a military

TABLE 1: Trends in Weapons Development

	1966		1972		1978		1979 (Official*)	
	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
ICBM Launchers	904	300	1054	1530	1054	1400	1054	1398
ICBM Launchers With MIRV's	0	0	200	0	550	370 ¹	550	608
SLBM Launchers	592	120	656	560	656	1015 ¹	656	950
SLBM Launchers With MIRV's	384	0	368	0	496	N.A.	496	144
Heavy Bombers	680	210	455	140	366	135	574 ²	156

*Figures provided in the "Statement of Data on Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty," submitted by Ralph Earle for the United States and by V. Karpov for the U.S.S.R. See footnote 1 for reference.

¹From the IISS, *Military Balance, 1978-79*, London, 1978, p. 81. IISS figures for 1979 apparently did not count the SS-19's which had already been placed in SS-11 silos, hence may have understated Soviet MIRV's somewhat. SLBM figures are, apparently, estimates based on suppositions about the number of SS-N-18's in the Soviet inventory.

²Includes, apparently, B-52's in storage.

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (issues for 1966, 1972-73, and 1978-79), London, 1966, 1972, 1978 and 1979; also, Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980*, Washington, D.C., 1979; and U.S. Department of State, *SALT II Agreement*, Selected Documents No. 12A, Department of State Publication 8984, Washington, D.C., 1979.

balance unfavorable to the United States. These partially contradictory interpretations arise from the complexity of the relationship between the SALT process and the military balance. Five related perspectives on that relationship suggest its complexity and some of its political weight.

1. SALT II as Legitimized Parity

One of the most significant developments in international politics during the past 10 to 15 years has been the growth of Soviet military power. The dimensions of this "big push," in some ways comparable to and derivative from the great industrialization drives of the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, have not yet captured American imagination. The Soviet Union has not only increased the numbers of its strategic forces, it has simultaneously engaged in an awesome modernization of its military hardware along a wide spectrum from intercontinental missiles to the infantryman's rifle. Table 1 summarizes some aggregate dimensions of this push in strategic weapons, but it hides entirely the modernization dynamic behind the figures. A third generation of Soviet strategic forces consisting of four new intercontinental missiles—SS-16's, 17's, 18's, and 19's—has been deployed since 1974, almost before the terms of the American defense debate had adjusted to the second generation that had been deployed between 1965 and 1968 (SS-9's, 11's, and 13's). Table 1 also suggests the difficulties of counting these forces, which are plainly asymmetrical. The Soviets have placed far more emphasis on their ICBM force; the United States has elected more balanced investment in its triad—land, sea and air-based forces.

The asymmetry of forces is only one difficulty in commenting on the strategic balance. Qualitative

comparisons are far more difficult than quantitative ones. For example, the comparison of Soviet and American SLBM launchers is very misleading. One product of the modernization program is that in 1972 the Soviet Union deployed an SLBM (SS-N-8) with a range of 4,800 miles, and has now begun to replace it with a new missile (SS-N-18) with an even longer range, more warheads and more reliable guidance. On the other hand, while the United States will not have SLBM's of comparable range until the Trident is deployed, American submarines are generally conceded to have significant technological advantages, and both the Polaris A3 and Poseidon C3 missiles (deployed in 1964 and 1971) will probably have some qualitative advantages over the new Soviet counterparts. Counting forces, then, is very complex and often misleading. Still, numbers in the balance count, because they have political importance in both Washington and Moscow.

The Interim Agreement of 1972 (SALT I) explicitly provided for Soviet numerical advantages—1,618 ICBM's to 1,054 for the United States, and 740 SLBM's to 656 for the United States. It also provided that the Soviet Union could build up to 950 SLBM's if it retired one older type ICBM or SLBM for each new SLBM between 740 and 950. The principle of the treaty was to accept Soviet quantitative advantages in the strategic balance in compensation for perceived United States qualitative advantages (principally MIRV's). The United States Senate resolution supporting SALT II urged the President to seek a new treaty that "would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."⁹ The notion that "imbalance" could be accepted in SALT I but that "balance" would be required in SALT II derived from the belief that American qualitative advantages would erode by the late 1970's or early 1980's.

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⁹The Interim Agreement, the Protocol and the Joint Resolution are all found in Willrich and Rhineland, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-315.

CHANGING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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came increasingly apparent that little would emerge from the meeting except SALT II. Although this was no small achievement, the broader panorama of Soviet-American relations was little changed. In fact, with the signing of SALT II and its submission to the Senate for debate and a ratification vote, both SALT and Soviet-American relations as a whole became the hostages of the United States Senate.

In the absence of ratification (or if the Senate were to approve amendments unacceptable to Moscow) the weakness of the Carter administration would be revealed, and progress in other areas of Soviet-American relations would be impeded. Thus, Congress would probably not be inclined to lift trade restrictions in the resulting rancorous atmosphere. On the other hand, if the Senate were to ratify SALT II essentially as negotiated, the Soviet tactic of permitting Jewish emigration to rise to an annual rate of 50,000 in the first half of 1979 (15,000 more than in the record year of 1973 and only 10,000 short of Senator Jackson's benchmark of "free" emigration in 1974) would probably yield the intended dividend. Prospects for success were further enhanced by the exchange of Enger and Chernyayev for five prominent Soviet dissidents, including Ginzburg. (Shcharansky, however, was left to serve his sentence of three years in prison and ten years in a strict-regime labor camp.)

The United States Secretaries of State and the Treasury held exploratory talks with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on the linked issues of emigration and trade in April; and Senator Adlai Stevenson 3d introduced legislation that would extend MFN status to both the Soviet Union and China. With the appointment of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., former IBM board chairman, as the next United States ambassador to the Soviet Union, the administration signaled its interest in bolstering trade ties.

Progress in establishing an informal détente to regulate Soviet and American conduct in areas of regional tension also hinges on the outcome of the Senate debate on SALT II. Little emerged from the summit meeting in this respect; the joint communiqué affirmed the importance of the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations between the two countries, which pledged mutual restraint in third world trouble spots. But the exchange of views between Presidents Carter and Brezhnev on the Middle East, southern Africa, and Southeast Asia led to no new understandings.

Moreover, the summit brought no substantive results on any of the issues under formal negotiation or on the subject of bilateral working groups: a comprehensive nuclear test ban, MBFR, limiting anti-

satellite hunter-killers, curbing transfers of conventional arms, prohibiting chemical weapons, and naval restrictions in the Indian Ocean (here the United States did agree to resume talks broken off a year ago to protest Soviet-Cuban activities in the Horn of Africa). Nor was action taken on extending or expanding any of the 11 bilateral agreements on cultural, academic, scientific and technical exchanges, although their importance was rhetorically acknowledged. Only one solid accord emerged from the summit: a ban on radiological weapons.

Nonetheless, the Americans viewed the summit as a positive exercise in communications. Held in Vienna instead of Washington, D.C., in deference to Brezhnev's ailing health, the conference produced agreement in principle to meet more regularly in the future, although no specific timetable was set. Similarly, it was agreed that officials below the top level would meet more often, after top military officials in both delegations met together for an exchange of views for the first time since World War II.

In light of Brezhnev's physical deterioration—he occasionally lost his balance while standing, had difficulty hearing, slurred his speech and once became disoriented—the broadening of official contacts may prove farsighted. With luck, such contacts may predispose Brezhnev's successors, whoever they may be, to place greater weight than otherwise on good relations with the United States. With so many other uncertainties bedeviling the superpowers, even a modest contribution toward stabilizing Soviet-American relations may be beneficial. ■

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 109)

with this new footholds on the strategically important, oil-rich Arabian Peninsula.

The latest Soviet overtures of friendship began in late January, 1979. This was one month after Prince Salman Ibn Abd al-Aziz, the Saudi governor of Riyadh, told a Lebanese journalist: "No one is a greater enemy of communism than Saudi Arabia. But we do not believe in altercations and we see no advantage in continuing our campaign against the Soviet Union." It was also in late January, two weeks after the Shah's departure from Iran had made his collapse incontrovertible, that O.A. Grinevskii, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near Eastern Department, visited Kuwait to reassure Kuwaiti officials (and through them other Arab governments in the Lower Gulf) that the U.S.S.R. was not responsible for the revolution in Iran and that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of any state.

At this same time, a very well-connected Soviet journalist, Igor Beliaev, wrote a lengthy article on

Saudi Arabia. For years Soviet analysts have alternated between harsh criticism of Saudi autocracy and placatory calls for better relations. What was important about Beliaev's piece was its timing: it came on the heels of the stunning setback to United States policy in Iran and the growing Saudi insecurity over events in the Yemens, Iran and Egypt.

Beliaev suggested that the time might be ripe for Soviet-Saudi reconciliation. Noting that "the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia had never been at war with each other," he said that their different social systems were no reason for hostility, especially since both countries shared opposition to Israeli policy and favored recognition of "the right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination and the creation of their own independent state and also the return of East Jerusalem to the Arabs." Beliaev implied that the "special" relationship that Washington was trying to develop with Saudi Arabia was contradicted by the "anti-Arab essence" of the Camp David agreements that the United States sought to press on the Arabs. He went out of his way to be conciliatory and reassuring.

In early March, 1979, Prince Saud al Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, in an interview with an Arab magazine, agreed that the Soviet Union was courting Saudi Arabia. He held the door ajar to commercial ties, saying that "We have no objections to establishing trade relations with any country in the world." More significantly, he said:

We used to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the past. It was the Soviets who broke them off. I would like to underline the fact that the absence of diplomatic relations does not mean that we do not recognize the Soviet Union, or that we do not recognize the important role it plays in world politics. On the contrary. We have always expressed our gratitude of the positive stand adopted by the Soviet Union regarding Arab problems.

The Saudis may be edging toward the normalization of their relations with the U.S.S.R. If so, this would be a major diplomatic breakthrough for Moscow in its objective of acquiring political leverage in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Soviet Union has yet to acquire direct and firm influence over any country in the Middle East; nevertheless, over the past generation its policy has skillfully exploited Western ineptness and regional conflicts and has effected a major change in the overall strategic environment within which Soviet diplomacy seeks to advance tangible Soviet aims.

Soviet policy has been remarkably free from ideological rigidity and has shown an essential pragmatism and awareness of geopolitical realities and local power balances. Opportunistic to the core, it is motivated by an underlying strategic rationale: to undermine the position of the United States and, wherever possible, to substitute the Soviet Union as

the main power in the area. Ambition, capability, and conviction make the Soviet Union a formidable factor in Middle East politics. ■

SINO-SOVIET CRISIS

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act as an intermediary. As the third week ended, Hanoi expressed skepticism, suggesting once more that China's withdrawal was a ruse to gain respite and time to reinforce. Clashes were said to be continuing north of Lang Son and in other frontier areas. But the general ferocity of the fighting seemed to have abated; the war appeared to be winding down.

Still, the military and political problems of Chinese withdrawal defied easy management. Hanoi's charges of atrocities were followed by reports of intensified battle. Hanoi accused China of burning and plundering. Beijing accused Vietnam of stepped-up harassment and attack, including renewed shelling of Chinese territory. New reports of Chinese pressure on the Laotian border heightened the uncertainty generated by the fighting on the main front. Attempts to hurry withdrawal grated against attempts to ensure its orderliness. The contradiction kept alive fears of further conflagration. Clearly, the apparent end to the conflict might yet prove to be merely the end of its first phase.

At this juncture the immediate scoresheet looked as follows. China had not succeeded in changing the course of events in Laos or Cambodia. She may not have intended to attack Hanoi itself, although Vietnam had to prepare for that eventuality. The odds on Moscow intervening for the defense of Hanoi/Haiphong were too great. On the other hand, China might have hoped to be able to take and hold a 15-25 kilometer strip south of the border. If such a strip had been secured, then China might have been able to bargain for "mutual withdrawal." It clearly could not be secured. Still, China demonstrated "will," and this may have been the sum total of her expectations. Beijing also succeeded in seriously souring Moscow-Washington relations, at little cost.

Vietnam, on the other hand, seemed once again to have taught a larger nation not to presume on apparent power discrepancies. The conflict also diverted attention from her serious economic reconstruction problems. It provided the pretext for the reestablishment of a war economy, the type of mobilized command economy to which her experience was suited. The war served as a valuable patriotic unifier and reinforcer.

Finally, through a carefully calibrated escalation of pressure and commitment, Moscow apparently succeeded in "proving" that the Soviet Union would not desert an ally in need. It retained credibility, without distracting from the picture of Chinese "aggression."

But the remarkable fact that apparent victors and apparent vanquished could all claim success was not a

recipe for stability. In subsequent weeks, there was a phony war state of high tension and suspicion accompanying determined preparations for a possible resumption of hostilities. After a formal Chinese assertion of full withdrawal, in mid-March, Chinese officials were invited to an abortive "peace talks" session in Hanoi. Hanoi's suggestion of a demilitarized zone along the border was not accepted. Mutual recrimination made further talks impractical and Hanoi repeated its charge that the Chinese withdrawal was not complete. China countered with repeated claims of Vietnamese shelling and incursions north of the border. Vietnam, Laos and the Soviet Union leveled new charges of Chinese force demonstrations along the Sino-Lao border. Laos expelled the final remnants of the Chinese construction corps on her soil, reaffirming her allegiance to Vietnam.

Vietnam remained mobilized. Some front-line troops thus released were thrown into a concerted campaign to break remaining Khmer Rouge guerrilla concentrations before the onset of the rainy season. By mid-April, the last significant rebel redoubt against the Thai border was reportedly overrun. In the meantime, Vietnam continued her rapid movement of premier divisions to the northern border regions of both Vietnam and Laos. Western analysts believed that the scale of the buildup exceeded defensive requirements.

Soviet air force units facilitated Vietnamese troop and equipment transport in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The Soviet navy began to call on Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam denied that Moscow had received or would receive permanent base rights. Nevertheless, the extension of limited repair and provisioning facilities evidently answered mutual interests. April also saw the Soviet Union's new VTOL aircraft carrier, the *Minsk*, move around Africa and into the Indian Ocean, evidently on its way to join the Pacific Fleet. The timing of the cruise astounded Western naval analysts, who presumed that the *Minsk* was scheduled for a longer testing period in her launch area in the Black Sea. The move highlighted the premium Moscow attached to the *Minsk*'s presence in the Far East. The military-political impact of its appearance off African and Indian Ocean rim countries, while considerable, was not sufficiently compelling to hazard extraordinary procedures. The possibility that the *Minsk* would "observe" a Vietnamese "visit" to the Chinese-occupied Paracel Islands suggested itself as a more plausible rationale, especially in view of Chinese claims that Soviet and Vietnamese naval demonstrations had already taken place in the area.

The *Minsk* did not proceed immediately to this theater of tension, but was deployed in a holding pattern off the Red Sea. The fact that it found a useful detour did not of course lessen its impact further east.

Beijing knew it was available. A potential can be as powerful a leverage of policy as an actuality, and it is sometimes more useful.

In April, China announced that she was withdrawing from the obviously moribund mutual aid and assistance treaty that had once bound her to Moscow. But she coupled this announcement with an offer to begin talks with the Soviet Union on the issues that separated the two countries. This time there was no mention of preconditions. The dramatic absence of a priori demands led some analysts to speculate on the prospects of reconciliation. Other observers suggested that China was seeking through parallel but separate negotiations with the Soviet Union and Vietnam to make each suspicious that the other might compromise its interests; the specter of separate accommodation might fray the loyalties of a new alliance. Others associated China's offer with a period of Deng Xiaoping prominence, after weeks of rumors that Chinese evaluations of the war against Vietnam were far from unanimous. The mid-June convening of China's National People's Congress, however, saw Hua Guofeng in the limelight, with the assertion that the government had "eliminated the root cause of unending political turmoil and splits." Hua claimed that talks with the Soviet Union would be successful only if there were a substantive change in Soviet global policy. Preconditions might not be a thing of the past after all.

Midsummer saw continued uncertainty about the cohesion of the Beijing leadership. The imminence of Soviet succession, attendant upon Brezhnev's failing health, added to the uncertainty. Moscow-Beijing talks proceeded haltingly, at best, while Hanoi-Beijing talks remained mired in suspicion. Moscow and Hanoi continued to strengthen their ties. Vietnam allowed the Soviet Union to establish an electronic listening post near Cam Ranh Bay; Tu-95 Bear reconnaissance planes were allowed to operate from Vietnamese airfields.

Many uncertainties remained. For the longer term future, there was little doubt that Moscow wanted accommodation—if too arrogantly so—and that this aspiration found an at least limited echo in Beijing. But for the immediate future, power politics remained the name of the game. In view of skepticism with regard to the ultimate character and steadfastness of United States aid to China, Moscow may well have emerged from 1978 and early 1979 with the better hand. Certainly China's action against Vietnam indicated that she feared this to be true and, furthermore, that she considered the consequences to be so detrimental to her interests that a major gamble was required.

The very fact that this balancing of accounts can be suggested with a semblance of logic is significant. It is particularly important if juxtaposed with evidence

that the "China consideration" acted as a spur to assertive Soviet policies in other regions. Washington and other NATO capitals think that their China policies handicap Moscow. If they lead instead to a greater Soviet willingness to pursue particular interests elsewhere, as appears to be the case, then the weighing of benefits becomes a murkier affair. ■

NUCLEAR ENERGY

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1976, are based on the widely accepted standards adopted by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. These standards must be met at each nuclear power plant in the U.S.S.R., and each plant must maintain a radiation safety department that has responsibility for the safety of plant personnel and for the monitoring of ambient radiation levels, in the plant and in the surrounding environment.¹⁶

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

As noted above, Soviet authorities expect to realize a considerable increase in nuclear generating capacity during the 1980's. From a 1975 level of 5,500 MW of nuclear power installed, capacity is expected to expand to a total of 18,700 MW by 1980, with a figure of 9,900 MW already reached by January, 1979. No goals have yet been suggested regarding a 1985 installed capacity for nuclear electric energy, but some development plans are fairly firm. Additional generating units will probably be built at the Kursk, Smolensk, Chernobyl, and South Ukraine stations; construction is already under way at new sites in Lithuania, on the Kerch Peninsula and near Khmelnitskiy in the Ukraine, and at sites near Zaporozh'ye, Kalinin and Volgodonsk. In addition to these six new complexes, a dozen others have been tentatively suggested as locations for future nuclear power complexes. The plan figure for the 1980-1985 five year plan, will undoubtedly be a minimum of 10,000—and much more likely closer to 20,000—newly constructed megawatts of capacity. The exact figure will depend somewhat on how closely the 1980 target figure is met.

There may be shortfall in the planned 1980 figure of 18,700 installed nuclear megawatts; earlier economic goal figures have often proved optimistic. For example, in the early 1970's, over 7,000 MW of installed nuclear capacity was projected for 1975, and 30,000 MW for 1980. Thus the current figure of 18,700 MW for 1980 probably represents a maximum practicable

installed capacity; somewhat less may actually be realized. By January 1, 1979, with 60 percent of the plan period elapsed, only about 30 percent of the planned 1976-1980 increment of 13,200 MW had been completed. There are also continuing delays at the Beloyarsk, Novovoronezh and Armenian sites. Finally, there are chronic problems in the delivery of supplies and components to the various construction sites. Nevertheless, whether or not the 1980 goal is reached, the Soviet Union has taken a sizable stride forward toward a powerful commercial nuclear reactor industry. And the Soviet Union uses atomic energy in several other ways: there are three nuclear ice-breakers in the Arctic and atomic explosives are used for excavation and for natural gas stimulation.

In summary, the Soviet Union is wholeheartedly committed to a very rapid expansion of its fledgling nuclear industry. In official pronouncements, Soviet leaders are apparently satisfied with the safety and security of all aspects of their commercial nuclear program. Their reactors are standardized and will soon be mass-produced at the new Atom mash facility. There are no regulatory or citizen-group hassles to contend with. The Soviet Union is committed to building breeder reactors, and in contrast to the United States, it relies heavily on graphite moderated reactors. Several commercial ships are powered by nuclear reactors. The Soviet program unquestionably differs from the American in both conception and direction. Yet the fissionable materials present the same potential problems in both countries. In the 1980's, it should become clearer whether the cautious stance of the United States or the full-throttle approach of the Soviet Union with regard to the development of "the peaceful atom" will be the wiser course. ■

SOVIET POLICIES IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 127)

Union. Khrushchev's "adventurism," contributing to enterprises without a clear, finite return, rarely emerges. The Aswan Dams of yesterday are being replaced by phosphate mines. The covert KGB agent is being supplemented by a representative of the Soviet fishing fleet administration. And Communist party organizers are being replaced by technical security advisers to maintain unpopular regimes.

At the same time, the transition to empire-building is not always clear-cut. In 1978, the Ghanaian government expelled five East European diplomats (one Soviet and four East Germans) for "trying to stir up unrest in the trade unions, the universities and the press."¹⁰ When the Soviet Union reportedly pressed Guinea's Sekou Toure for rights to build a major naval base near Conakry, Toure turned down the

¹⁰ *West Africa*, September 18, 1978, p. 1854.

¹⁶ A.I. Ioirysh, "Legal Regulation of Environmental Effects of Atomic Energy," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 6, 1973, translated in *Soviet Law and Government*, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring, 1974), p. 50. For more information on radiation safety at plant sites, gaseous emissions, results of monitoring programs, etc., see I.D. Morokhov et al., *Atomnoy energetike XX let* (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1974), pp. 172-185; and N.G. Gusev, "Radiation Safety at Nuclear Power Stations," *Soviet Atomic Energy*, vol. 41, no. 4 (October, 1976), pp. 890-896.

request and terminated TU-95 reconnaissance flights based in Guinea.¹¹ The dispatch of large Soviet fishing fleets to the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans was accompanied by routine Soviet navy patrols, and Soviet intelligence ships intermingled with the fishing ships. The two fleets clearly aided one another.

In one very important sense, the Soviet approach to Africa will be determined by other powers. If the Soviet Union can obtain its goals more cheaply by other routes, it will do so. The Soviet experience of the last few years has led Soviet leaders to believe that force (particularly the use of proxies) is an effective means of settling disputes in Africa. The grab for power in Angola was successful, and the Dergue in Ethiopia is working with the same formula in mind—in both cases, negotiation was not necessary. (The Soviet Union may be disabused of that formula in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.) For a short time after the Angolan and Ethiopian crises, the United States toyed with the idea of using force in Africa, but soon returned to diplomacy.¹²

From the African point of view, the Soviet transition from revolutionary to imperialist ambition means that Soviet interests become negotiable. A true revolutionary never negotiates, since the future is all or nothing; today, Soviet foreign policy is becoming more tentative. The African attempt to condemn Soviet armed intervention at the 1978 meeting of the Organization of African Unity brought howls of Soviet protest, because a resolution of condemnation would be costly in tangible assets and in intangible goodwill.

The Soviet Union is creating a policy with minimal exposure in terms of assets. Investments in large capital projects are not repaid through uncertain cash flows; Soviet technicians will ensure that raw material keeps flowing to the Soviet Union in repayment. Even political-military investments are not made until the Soviet Union appears sure of the opposition's weakness: a few Cuban troops initially, then a thousand Cubans and a few Soviet advisers and, finally, the big airlift for the winning side. Military assets are kept as portable as possible, because leaders change unpredictably in African countries.

For observers in the West, the transition in Soviet policy is welcome; the West and the Soviet Union may eventually agree on some ground rules for diplomatic conduct in Africa. Of some importance, too, is the fact that Soviet behavior is more rational; in effect, it is becoming more familiar all the time, as the Soviet weighing of interests in Africa increasingly takes on the appearance of Western policymaking practices.

¹¹"Soviets Held Losing Guinea Base Access," *Los Angeles Times*, May 31, 1978, p. 12.

¹²See "U.S. Seeks Plan for Resisting Soviet-Cuban Thrust in Africa," *Washington Post*, May 19, 1978, p. 1; and "Carter Study of Soviets, Cubans in Africa Is Accelerated in Wake of New Fighting," *Wall Street Journal*, May 18, 1978, p. 12.

SOVIET POLICIES IN EAST EUROPE

(Continued from page 123)

states may weaken. In that event, one or more of the incoming East European party bosses may emulate the economic reforms of a Janos Kádár in Hungary or the independent stance of a Ceausescu in Romania. That indeed would signal a significant change.³⁷

³⁷One analyst raises the question why the East European regimes should continue to supply high-grade machinery and consumer durables to the U.S.S.R., when they will be unable to count on oil and grain from the latter in the 1980's. Keith Bush, "Soviet Economic Growth," *Survey*, vol. 23, no. 2 (1978), p. 14.

SALT II AND THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

(Continued from page 131)

One of the significant results of SALT II was the agreement to provide (for the first time) a "data base" of numbers for forces on both sides. This commits the Soviet Union to provide data on agreed categories of its own strategic offensive weapons at "each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission." The numbers provided at the Vienna summit are reflected in the 1979 figures of Tables 1 and 2. They reveal that rough parity has been achieved between the superpowers in strategic weapons. Within the framework of asymmetrical forces, each side has some advantages and disadvantages, and SALT II has legitimized a kind of functional parity. While arguments have been mounted against the treaty, in Moscow as well as in Washington, on grounds that focus on the other side's advantages, each power has chosen its particular mix of ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers. The implication of arguments that exact numerical equality should prevail in each category of weapons ignores the history of force development and is probably a foolish kind of geometric thinking. The functional parity of SALT II means that for each side the "advantages" of the other do not represent an intolerable risk.

These arguments about asymmetrical numbers in SALT II miss a more serious issue. The real question is whether the strategic balance is more stable with the treaty than without it. Table 2 provides some rough estimates of what might happen by 1985 without the treaty. These estimates are especially dependent on assumptions about the political climate that would be generated by rejection of the treaty or by the subsequent disavowal of it by either party.¹⁰

¹⁰The Soviets took great care to warn the United States against rejection or modification of the treaty, both before and after the Vienna summit. Brezhnev was explicit in his

TABLE 2: Estimates of Arms in 1985

	1979 Actual		1985 Estimates			
	U.S.	USSR	With SALT II		Without SALT II	
1. Total Delivery Vehicles	2,284	2,504	2,000- 2,250	2,250	2,100- 2,320	2,650 3,050
a) ICBM's	1,054	1,398				
b) SLBM's	656	950				
c) Bombers	574	156				
2. Total MIRVed Launchers	1,046	752				
a) ICBM's	550	608				
b) SLBM's	496	144	1,320	1,320	1,483	2,000- 2,400
c) ASBM's	0	0				
3. Bombers with ALCM's with range over 600 kms.	(3)	0				
4. Total deliverable warheads (approximate)	10,000	5,000	11,500- 12,000	10,000	14,000- 17,000	12,000- 12,000

Sources: Figures compiled by the author from several sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1978-79, London, 1978; Department of State, *SALT II Agreement*, Selected Documents No. 12A, Washington, D.C., 1979; Department of State, *SALT II: Basic Guide*, Publication 8974, Washington, D.C., 1979; Les Aspin, "The Soviet Military Threat: Rhetoric Versus Facts," in Fred Warner Neal, ed., *Détente or Debacle* (New York: Norton, 1979), pp. 87-108 (this chapter is based on a research paper circulated by Congressman Aspin in November, 1977).

But the estimates are probably reasonable if one assumes that in the absence of a treaty neither side panics and that both make somewhat larger efforts to develop their strategic forces. The estimates assume that the Soviet Union will continue to deploy the SS-18's, SS-N-18's and 19's at the rates of recent years, but will not dismantle its launchers for the older SS-11's, 13's, and 9's.

On the American side, these estimates assume that the remaining Minuteman silos are MIRVed, but that no significant additional changes are made in ICBM forces until the first deployment of the MX missile after 1985. It also assumes that the United States effort in SLBM's will be to deploy the Trident and that numbers of missiles will remain relatively stable. These assumptions, of course, are vulnerable to the possibility that Congress might react strongly to the emerging Soviet superiority. The United States might undertake a number of short-term options in the absence of SALT II to head off clear Soviet superior-

ity, but it is doubtful that any combination of these options would leave the United States relatively "better off" in the absence of SALT II.

2. SALT II as Strategic Management

The treaty, then, can be seen as a tool by which each side has managed the strategic relationship. It addresses particular weapons systems that represent problems in defense management on both sides. For example, the Soviet Union clearly tried to head off the American deployment of cruise missiles following the Kissinger visit to Moscow in January, 1975, and the prohibition against deployment of GLCM's and SLCM's with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers and the inclusion of ALCM's within the MIRV ceiling responded to this Soviet defense concern. Similarly, the Soviet leaders have worried publicly about both the B-1 bomber and the MX missile.¹¹ While they did not need the treaty to "manage" the former, their willingness to accept an aggregate MIRV ceiling that includes bombers with ASBM's and ALCM's and the 820 subceiling on ICBM's with MIRV's provided some parameters to which the MX and cruise missile programs would conform. Clearly the principal American motive for the treaty was to reduce uncertainties about the pace at which the Soviets might deploy their new MIRVed ICBM's (SS-17, 18, and 19) and SLBM's (SS-N-18).

3. SALT II as an Extension of Détente

The Soviet leadership clearly saw the achievement of the SALT II agreements as an important foreign policy accomplishment.¹² Brezhnev himself seemed increasingly to attach his personal prestige to its completion. It would be a mistake to underestimate the Kremlin's stake in détente, although that policy was always seen as compatible with—indeed depen-

speech at the dinner held in honor of Carter at the U.S.S.R. embassy on the eve of the signing: "Any attempt to shake this complicated structure . . . to replace any of its parts, to pull it closer to oneself, would be an unprofitable exercise. The entire structure might collapse—with grave and even dangerous consequences. . . ." *Pravda*, June 18, 1979, p. 1. Back in Moscow the whole government and party went on record: "No deviations whatsoever from it can be deemed acceptable." *Ibid.*, June 22, 1979, p. 1.

¹¹These statements can be found throughout 1976-1978. One especially detailed example was an editorial in *Pravda*, February 11, 1978, p. 4.

¹²There is a tone of patience and statesmanship to Brezhnev's many public advocations of SALT II between 1974 and 1979. See, for example, his address to the 25th Party Congress, *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, his speech to the Trade Union Congress just before U.S. Secretary Cyrus Vance's visit to Moscow in 1977. *Ibid.*, March 22, 1977, and his speech while touring the Pacific Fleet in April, 1978, *ibid.*, April 8, 1978.

dent upon—the great push of military development that it paralleled. Détente did not suggest to Brezhnev and his aged Politburo any diminution of their support for “progressive political forces,” especially in the third world. Nonetheless, Brezhnev seemed to reach the pinnacle of his career with the 1972-1974 summits. He spoke often and articulately of the way his policies had transformed the world balance of power and seemed ebullient in assessing the prospects for the future.¹³ These were not affected enthusiasms, and it can be argued that the Soviet leaders were willing to pay some political price for the achievement of SALT I (1972), the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975), and for SALT II (1979).

For Brezhnev, and his colleagues, these accomplishments represent a long-pursued end to perceived Soviet inferiority, acceptance of the U.S.S.R. as a genuine global superpower, and the final elimination of Western refusal to come to terms with the demonstration of Soviet power in World War II. These are not small successes, and future Soviet historians (and possibly historians outside the U.S.S.R. as well) will almost certainly praise Brezhnev's leadership. The pride the Soviet leadership has sometimes allowed itself is justified. It has pursued rational goals with determination, tenacity and skill.

4. SALT II as the Product of Altered United States Politics

An almost perverse reflection of the Soviet sense of achievement has occurred in American politics. While the Soviet Union played little part in the reduced confidence in national purpose which resulted from the failure of United States policy in Vietnam, the Watergate scandal, and the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the emergence of the U.S.S.R. as a global military superpower and the contrast between Soviet satisfaction with recent developments and American apprehension have had an effect on the atmosphere of American politics. There can be, nonetheless, little doubt that the terms of debate in the United States over Soviet-American relations have changed since the 1972 and 1974 summits. The Soviet leaders themselves bear some responsibility for the rise of strong political forces in the United States opposed to any improvement in relations and determined to “correct” what they perceive as American military vulnerability. The development and deployment programs of the SS-16's, 17's, 18's, 19's, and 20's could hardly have been timed to produce a more adverse effect on American support for détente. Soviet and Cuban

intervention in Africa reinforced the mood of suspicion which had been growing in Washington. Still, it was SALT II that gave focus to the growing number of well-financed organizations hostile to the course of Soviet-American relations between 1974 and 1979. SALT II, and the debate over its ratification in the Senate, cannot be understood apart from the alteration in the terms of the United States debate over Soviet-American relations that has accompanied the negotiations since the Vladivostok summit. The administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter have been on the defensive with respect to their SALT II politics and their more general support for détente.

5. SALT II as a Gamble in Transformational Politics

Finally, there is a sense in which the SALT II agreements represent an interesting kind of mutual gamble by Moscow and Washington. The accomplishments of the Brezhnev period were achieved by economic priorities that clearly favored military demands on national resources. If the objective of this big military push has been “parity,” as Soviet commentators have often suggested, SALT II should enable a gradual reorientation of Soviet priorities. The development will not come quickly or dramatically—clearly the treaty preserves opportunities on both sides for costly strategic modernization, and strategic forces are not the most expensive forces in either nation's inventories. But as a process, as a set of parameters that cap some avenues of competition, SALT II may establish a period of relative stability in the strategic relationship, out of which increased confidence may emerge on both sides.

Certainly there will be continued debate in the United States about programs to improve military forces, and whether or not the treaty in effect will play an important role. It is possible that it will do so in Moscow as well. There will be a new political leadership in the Soviet Union during the treaty's duration, and the outcome of the succession question will depend in part on the resolution of the defense issue and will affect it profoundly.

For the United States and the Soviet Union, SALT II represents a mutual gamble that the ongoing struggle over the role of defense spending will be settled in a way more favorable than without the agreements. The judgments of this gamble are fine and the balance of political forces in both capitals is delicate. Each will monitor the impact of SALT II in the other very carefully. The chances that the arms race might be turned around do not seem high, but the opportunities to achieve this end in the first half of the 1980's may be unparalleled. SALT II, managed with persistence and statesmanship, may support the transformation of political and economic priorities in the United States and the Soviet Union. ■

¹³See for example his speeches to the East German party congress, *ibid.*, June 1, 1971, and during a visit to France in the fall of 1971, *ibid.*, October 6, 1976. Both followed the 24th Party Congress and set the tone for the next two years.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of August, 1979, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Limitation

Aug. 14—The 1979 session of the 39-nation Geneva disarmament conference (the Committee on Disarmament) ends in Geneva without any major agreement; France participated in the conference for the 1st time since it began in 1962. The session began January 27.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Aug. 30—The agricultural ministers of the 5 ASEAN nations conclude a 2-day meeting in Manila and report the establishment of a 50,000-metric ton emergency rice reserve, to be drawn on at need by member countries.

Commonwealth Conference

Aug. 1—In Lusaka, Zambia, Prime Minister of Great Britain Margaret Thatcher addresses the opening session of the 39-member conference; she criticizes the Nigerian government for nationalizing the assets of the Shell-British Petroleum Development Corporation.

Aug. 3—Prime Minister Thatcher criticizes the constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia because its provisions enable the white minority to block constitutional changes in Parliament.

Aug. 5—Commonwealth leaders adopt a peace plan for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia that calls for a cease-fire, a new constitution and new elections under British supervision.

Aug. 7—The conference ends.

Middle East

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—The headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization reports that on July 24 its unarmed truce observers began to relieve the United Nations Emergency Force of duties in the Sinai buffer zone; the operation is now complete; there are no U.S. or Soviet observers.

Aug. 5—The Israeli government says it will never negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Aug. 7—Egyptian, U.S. and Israeli negotiators agree on the "Modalities of Elections" for Palestinian rule on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip; further details must be worked out at later meetings.

Aug. 11—In an interview released today, U.S. President Jimmy Carter affirms that he is "against any creation of a separate Palestinian state"; the Palestine Liberation Organization "must accept the right of Israel to exist . . . and accept . . . United Nations Resolution 242 . . ."

Aug. 22—Robert Strauss, President Carter's special Middle East envoy, reveals that President Carter has agreed with the recommendation of his advisers "that we not go forward with an independent resolution of our own [on Palestinian rights]."

Aug. 24—In an interview in Vienna, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim says that an effort should be made "to obtain reciprocal recognition" agreement by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel.

Southeast Asian Refugee Problem

(See also *U.N.*)

Aug. 2—A U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet carrier strike force leaves the coast of Thailand for the South China Sea on a training exercise whose main objective is the rescue of Vietnamese refugees at sea.

Aug. 3—The U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees issues a statement charging that in spite of promises made by many nations, they are continuing to reject Vietnamese "boat people" who reach their countries seeking asylum.

Aug. 30—According to reports from Hong Kong, Danish and Israeli ships have rescued 106 "boat people" at sea. The U.S. Navy reports that merchant ships have rescued nearly 300 people in the last week.

United Nations

(See also *Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 22—According to the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of Vietnamese refugees declined to 2,458 in the first 2 weeks of August from 11,919 in the same 2 weeks in July; in the first 2 weeks of June 26,800 refugees left Vietnam.

Aug. 26—The U.N. Fund for Population Activities opens a 5-day conference of 60 parliamentary governments in Colombo, Sri Lanka, to discuss the impact of rising population on third world economic development.

Aug. 30—Speaking in the Security Council, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim condemns both Israeli and PLO attacks in southern Lebanon.

AFGHANISTAN

Aug. 18—Muslim guerrillas claim to have liberated a province from government control and to have established an Islamic government there.

Aug. 19—Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin claims there are between 1,000 and 1,500 Soviet military advisers stationed in Afghanistan.

BOLIVIA

Aug. 7—Because none of the candidates in the July 1 presidential election won a majority, Congress elects a provisional government, to be headed by President-elect Walter Guevara Arze; new presidential elections are scheduled for May, 1980. The military has ruled for 11 years.

CAMBODIA

Aug. 3—In Hanoi, officials from the United Nations and the International Red Cross report that 2.5 million Cambodians face starvation.

Aug. 9—The U.S. State Department urges that an international relief effort be undertaken in Cambodia.

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

Aug. 6—A panel of judges from 5 African nations issues a

Erratum: We regret a printer's error that appeared in our September, 1979, issue. In the map of Israel and occupied territory on page 89, the territory occupied by Israel on the map should have included the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The black-shaded area on the map is the UN buffer zone.

report accusing Emperor Bokassa I of being present at the Bangui prison April 18 when 100 schoolchildren were murdered.

Aug. 17—In Paris, a French Ministry of Cooperation spokesman announces that France will reduce the amount of economic aid sent to the country; health, food and education aid will be continued.

CHAD

Aug. 18—Meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, 9 African foreign ministers call for a cease-fire and for the dissolution of the national union government. Since February, 1979, thousands of people have been killed in fighting between Muslims in the north and Christians in the south.

Aug. 21—9 rival groups agree to form a transitional government of national union with Chad Liberation Front leader Goukouni Oueddei as President and leader of the Christian forces Wadal Abdelkadar Kamougue as Vice President; free elections must be held within 18 months.

CHINA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 12—Deputy Prime Minister Chen Muhua describes proposals to limit population growth and to achieve zero population growth between 1985 and 2000; couples who have more than 2 children will be penalized by taxation and other economic measures. The present population is estimated at 960 million.

Aug. 14—Chinese officials and officers from Pan American World Airways sign an agreement permitting general purpose flights between San Francisco and Shanghai.

Aug. 20—The Peking Patriotic Catholic Association, an independent church group, welcomes Pope John Paul II's invitation of yesterday to reestablish relations with the Vatican.

CUBA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 10—The Cuban government and the Associated Press sign a contract for Associated Press service in Cuba after a 10-year interruption.

ECUADOR

Aug. 10—Jaime Roldós Aguilera is sworn in as President and Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea as Vice President; the inauguration of the newly elected government brings to an end 9 years of civilian and military dictatorial rule.

EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Aug. 5—In Paris, it is reported that President Nguema Biyoto Masie, President of a repressive regime for 11 years, has been overthrown by the Revolutionary Military Council.

FRANCE

(See *Intl, Arms Limitation; Central African Empire*)

GERMANY, WEST

Aug. 26—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrives in Damascus, Syria, for the first of several visits with leaders of Arab countries.

GHANA

Aug. 10—A revolutionary court sentences 4 senior Gha-

naian military officers to 10-year prison terms for crimes against the state.

GUINEA

Aug. 8—In Washington, D.C., President Ahmed Sékou Touré arrives for a visit with U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

INDIA

Aug. 4—President N. Sanjiva Reddy suspends Parliament until August 20.

Aug. 10—The government launches its first satellite launch vehicle; the fourth stage fails to go into orbit and falls into the Bay of Bengal.

Aug. 20—Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announces that her Congress party faction will oppose a confidence motion in Parliament.

Following Gandhi's Congress party decision, Prime Minister Charan Singh resigns; his government was in office for only 24 days.

Aug. 22—President Reddy calls for national elections to be held in 3 months; he dissolves Parliament. Singh is asked to form a caretaker government until elections are held.

IRAN

(See also *U.S., Administration*)

Aug. 2—The government forms a new intelligence service, the Iranian National Information and Security Organization, to replace Savak, the Shah's security force.

Aug. 3—Elections are held for a constitutional council; 20 political groups boycott the election.

Aug. 6—Election results give Muslim clergymen 60 of the 73 seats on the council to draft a new constitution.

Aug. 12—In Teheran, demonstrators protesting the suppression of the news media clash with Islamic militants in the worst rioting since the overthrow of the Shah.

Aug. 13—The Ministry of National Guidance issues severe restrictions on foreign journalists; foreign journalists will be "held responsible for any article that is against the Islamic revolution in Iran . . . and they will be liable for prosecution."

Aug. 16—In the Kurdistan region, Kurdish rebels take control of the town of Paveh from revolutionary guards.

Aug. 18—Government troops attack the town of Paveh and drive out the Kurdish rebels.

Aug. 19—The government orders troops to quash the Kurdish rebellion in Sanandaj, the Kurdistan capital.

Aug. 20—The government closes 22 independent newspapers.

Aug. 22—In a speech broadcast by the state radio, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini offers the Kurds about \$75 million to end their rebellion and accept Islamic rule. Fighting in Kurdistan continues; 75 Kurds and 14 revolutionary guards have been reported killed in the last several days.

Aug. 23—In Paveh, 29 Kurds are executed by government troops for "waging war on God and his representatives."

Aug. 24—In Mehabad, Kurdish leader Abdul Rahman Qasselmou threatens "all-out war" against the Khomeini government.

Aug. 25—In Saqqiz, government troops put down a 4-day siege by Kurdistan rebels.

Aug. 27—In Teheran, a delegation of Kurdish rebels agree to a cease-fire.

Aug. 28—In Saqqiz, 20 Kurdish rebels and their sympathizers are executed by government troops on order of the Islamic revolutionary courts.

Aug. 31—In a nationwide televised address, Prime Minister

Mehdi Bazargan again asks to be relieved of office; he urges Ayatollah Khomeini to take responsibility for the government directly.

IRAQ

- Aug. 5—*Al Ahram*, the semiofficial newspaper, accuses Syrian President Hafez al-Assad of conspiring to overthrow Saddam Hussein, the new President of Iraq.
 Aug. 6—President Assad denies any involvement in an attempted coup.
 Aug. 7—A special Iraqi court finds 22 people guilty of conspiring to overthrow the government and sentences them to death; 5 are members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. Middle East; Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Aug. 2—Israeli troops raid 2 Palestinian guerrilla camps in Lebanon; 10 Palestinians are reported killed.
 Aug. 3—Prime Minister Menachem Begin is discharged from the hospital 2 weeks after he suffered a minor stroke. He will return to work in a week.
 Aug. 13—In Tel Aviv, a general strike involving more than a million workers is staged for 2 hours to protest the rising cost of living.
 Aug. 14—Israeli naval commandos attack Arab terrorists along the Beirut-Tyre highway; 8 Arab guerrillas are killed.
 Aug. 20—Israeli planes attack 3 Palestinian guerrilla camps in southern Lebanon near the port of Tyre.
 Aug. 23—The Cabinet reaffirms its intention to continue strikes in southern Lebanon.
 Aug. 24—Israeli air attacks continue over the port of Tyre for the 6th day.

ITALY

- Aug. 1—Filippo Maria Pandolfi, a Christian Democrat, fails to form a new government.
 Aug. 4—At the request of President Sandro Pertini, Christian Democrat and former Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga forms a new government; his Cabinet, made up primarily of Christian Democrats, includes Social Democrats and Liberals.
 Aug. 5—The new Cabinet is sworn in.
 Aug. 11—By a vote of 287 to 242, Prime Minister Cossiga wins a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies; the Socialist party abstains from the confidence vote.
 Aug. 12—The government wins a vote of confidence in the Senate by a vote of 153 to 118. The country has been without an official government since January 31, 1979.

KOREA, SOUTH

- Aug. 11—In Seoul, government forces raid the headquarters of the New Democratic party, the main opposition party; one woman is killed. New Democratic party leader Kim Young Sam accuses President Park Chung Hee of carrying out a "systematic campaign against the opposition."
 Aug. 15—The government releases 53 political dissidents from prison.

LEBANON

(See also *Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Aug. 9—By a vote of 54 to 9, the new government of Selim al-Hoss wins a vote of confidence in Parliament.
 Aug. 24—President Elias Sarkis asks for an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council because of the recent attacks by Israel.

MAURITANIA

- Aug. 5—In a peace agreement with the Polisario Front (the Algerian-backed guerrillas), the government agrees to waive its claims to the southern third of the Western Sahara, which it annexed in 1976 when Spain gave up her sovereignty. In 1976, the Moroccan government annexed the northern two-thirds of the area and sent troops to help Mauritania maintain her territory.
 Aug. 9—The Moroccan government rejects the peace agreement between Mauritania and the Polisarios, withdraws her troops from Mauritania and claims the southern third of the Western Sahara as a Moroccan province.
 Aug. 14—In Rabat, tribal chiefs from the southern section of the Western Sahara swear allegiance to King Hassan II of Morocco. Mauritania denounces Morocco.
 Polisario Front guerrilla leader Hakim Brahimi says his group is prepared to fight Morocco for the "complete sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the area claimed by the Polisarios as the Democratic Saharan Republic.
 Aug. 25—Polisario guerrillas claim to have killed hundreds of Moroccan soldiers in the southern Moroccan fort of Lebkuirate.

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Administration, Foreign Policy*)

MOROCCO

(See *Mauritania*)

NAMIBIA (SOUTH-WEST AFRICA)

(See *South Africa*)

NICARAGUA

- Aug. 3—In Managua, 50,000 demonstrators parade in support of the Sandinist government that took office 2 weeks ago.
 Aug. 4—Two moderate members of the junta, Alfonso Robelo Callejas and Sergio Ramírez Mercado, criticize the U.S. for not giving sufficient aid to the new government and for channeling its aid through the International Red Cross.
 Aug. 9—The junta decrees that the Nicaraguan Institute of Internal and External Commerce will be the sole buying agent for all exports of coffee, cotton, sugar and fish. In addition, all property owned by the family of Anastasio Somoza Debayle will be turned over to the people in the form of public facilities.
 Aug. 16—*La Prensa*, the country's leading paper that opposed the Somoza administration, resumes publication.
 U.S. Ambassador Lawrence A. Pezzullo says the U.S. will send aid directly to the new government rather than through international agencies.
 Aug. 21—The government issues a bill of rights, guaranteeing citizens equal rights under the law, due process, and freedom of speech, unless national security is in jeopardy.

NIGERIA

(See also *Intl. Commonwealth Conference*)

- Aug. 11—Nationwide presidential elections are held.
 Aug. 16—Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National party receives nearly 5.7 million votes and is expected to take office October 1. He defeated Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Nigerian People's party, a former President of Nigeria, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Nigerian Union party.

Aug. 18—The electoral commission confirms Shehu Shagari's victory.

Aug. 21—The U.S. State Department reports that Nigeria has ordered the Soviet Union to reduce the number of its military advisers in Nigeria from 40 to 5.

SOMALIA

Aug. 30—In the August 25 referendum, voters approve almost unanimously a new constitution that calls for parliamentary elections; the previous constitution was suspended in 1969 by President Mohammed Siad Barre.

SOUTH AFRICA

Aug. 1—Prime Minister P.W. Botha appoints Gerrit Viljoen, rector of the Rand Afrikaans University, as administrator general of Namibia (South-West Africa); he is considered to be a white racial extremist and is the leader of the Broederbond, a right-wing Afrikaans movement concerned with the preservation of Afrikaan culture and political power.

Aug. 13—Prime Minister Botha grants legislative powers to the National Assembly in Namibia.

Formal talks on Namibia's future begin between Botha and British envoy James Murray.

Aug. 22—Former Minister of Information Eschel M. Rhoodie is extradited from France.

Aug. 23—Rhoodie returns to South Africa under armed guard; he faces trial for misappropriation of \$75 million while he was Information Minister in the government of Prime Minister John Vorster.

Aug. 30—A Supreme Court panel clears former Minister of Information Cornelius P. Mulder of charges that he attempted to prevent an investigation into the misuse of funds by the Information Ministry.

Aug. 31—Prime Minister Botha tours Soweto, the black ghetto outside Johannesburg where there were race riots in 1976. He is the first high-level official to visit Soweto.

SUDAN

Aug. 12—President Gaafar al-Nimeiry dismisses Vice President and Sudanese Socialist Union secretary general Abdel Kassim Mohammed Ibrahim from his posts because of the continuing problems of inflation.

Aug. 17—In an attempt to cope with continuing unrest over food and fuel prices, President Nimeiry dismisses 7 Cabinet ministers and 2 top advisers; the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood is made a Cabinet member.

SYRIA

(See also *Iraq*)

Aug. 8—In Baghdad, 21 people are executed for conspiring against the government; they include 5 members of the Revolutionary Command Council.

UGANDA

Aug. 5—President Godfrey L. Binaisa offers "a huge reward" for the capture of former President Idi Amin, who is believed to be living in the Sudan.

Aug. 16—The government announces that 232 people imprisoned during the turmoil of Amin's ouster will be released.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *U.S., Economy, Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 19—Soviet astronauts Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Lyakhov and Valery Ryumin return to earth aboard their Soyuz 34 craft; they were in orbit for a record 175 days in space.

Aug. 23—For the first time in 2 months, Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev appears in public.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl. Commonwealth Conference*)

Aug. 10—The Cabinet approves Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's plan for a conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to be held in London on September 10.

Aug. 14—The government extends invitations to the conference to the government of Rhodesian Prime Minister Abel T. Muzorewa and to the Patriotic Front.

Northern Ireland

Aug. 27—Earl Mountbatten of Burma, a cousin of Queen Elizabeth II's, is killed when his fishing boat explodes at sea off Ireland. The Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) claims responsibility for the killings; 3 other passengers are killed and Mountbatten's daughter is seriously wounded.

In County Down, about 35 miles south of Belfast, 17 British soldiers are killed by a bomb blast; the IRA claims responsibility for the bombing.

Aug. 28—In Brussels, the IRA claims responsibility for a bomb blast on an open-air stage where the British Army band was preparing for a concert; 15 people are injured.

Aug. 29—In the wake of the recent killings, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher tours northern Ireland by helicopter and automobile; she visits army and police outposts.

Aug. 30—In Dublin, Ireland, police arrest 2 men and charge them with the murder of Earl Mountbatten. Both men are members of the IRA.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Aug. 1—The Senate confirms Benjamin Civiletti as Attorney General, succeeding Griffin Bell.

Aug. 4—In Bridgeport, Connecticut, U.S. District Judge T.F. Gilroy Daly frees 3 Americans who were convicted of drug charges in Mexico and were serving their sentences in a U.S. jail under the so-called voluntary exchange program. Under the terms of the treaty, Mexico retains "exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge, modify or set aside sentences handed down" by Mexican courts; U.S. Department of Justice officials fear that the ruling will threaten the exchange program.

Aug. 6—Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland announces a new Department of Agriculture program, backed by \$50 million in federal and private funds, to aid in the development of cooperatives among owners of small areas of farmland in Florida, Louisiana and Alabama.

Aug. 12—Central Intelligence Agency oil experts say that Iran's oil production will remain at its 4 million barrels a day level and may drop to 2.9 million by 1985 because of Iran's neglect of her oilfields; under Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, Iran produced about 6 million barrels of oil a day.

Aug. 16—Oil from the Mexican Ixtoc I well near Yucatan, which blew out of control on June 3 at a rate of an estimated 850,000 barrels a day, has now coated 20 miles of Texas beaches and menaces the Louisiana coast, according to John Robinson, government scientific coordinator of the oil-fighting force.

Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger warns that we must maintain a military balance with the Soviet Union in the Middle East if we are to maintain our source of energy there.

Aug. 17—President Carter decontrols the price on domestically produced heavy crude oil and says that he will ask Congress to exempt this product from his proposed windfall profits tax.

Aug. 23—After criticism from the presidential panel investigating the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office director Harold Denton rescinds his decision made yesterday to resume the licensing of new nuclear reactors.

Aug. 24—President Jimmy Carter concludes a 7-day vacation on the Mississippi River; he and his family sailed on a paddle-wheel river boat, the Delta Queen.

Aug. 28—In Boston, new Energy Secretary Charles Duncan, Jr., tells the 9 New England state governors that his department will establish a 10-million barrel home heating oil reserve for the nation's Northeast. He also says that President Carter will ask Congress to increase federal aid to poor families to \$400 million, to help pay this winter's fuel bills.

The Environmental Protection Agency announces that some of its more stringent and expensive water pollution regulations will be relaxed; the move can save U.S. companies up to \$200 million.

Civil Rights

Aug. 12—Some 164 members of the Ku Klux Klan are arrested in Montgomery, Alabama, for marching without a parade permit on a highway near Montgomery; the Klan members started their march August 9 from Selma, Alabama, to repeat the route of the freedom march of Martin Luther King, Jr., and his voting rights demonstrators in 1965. The Klan says it is marching for white rights.

Aug. 13—The Justice Department files suit in U.S. district court in Philadelphia against the Philadelphia Police Department and the City of Philadelphia to enjoin the police from engaging in "widespread and systematic" brutal behavior. City officials deny the charges and call them politically motivated.

Aug. 29—Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward orders all ship and shore commanders to use their authority to "deal effectively with racist activity."

Economy

Aug. 3—The Department of Labor reports that unemployment rose to 5.7 percent in July.

Aug. 6—At ceremonies swearing in new Treasury Secretary G. William Miller and Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker, President Carter says that he will maintain his present economic policies in spite of revised and gloomier economic assessments.

Aug. 9—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 1.1 percent in July.

Aug. 10—The Department of Agriculture predicts a record corn harvest of 7.11 billion bushels, a record soybean harvest of 2.13 billion bushels, and a harvest of 2.13 billion bushels of wheat in 1979. The Department predicts that the Soviet Union will have a 1979 grain harvest of 185 million tons, below the goal of 226 million tons.

Aug. 16—The Federal Reserve Board reports that industrial production fell 0.1 percent in July.

The Federal Reserve Board increases its discount rate to a record 10.5 percent.

Aug. 24—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 1 percent in July.

Aug. 27—The Department of Commerce reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for July was \$1.1 billion.

Aug. 28—Most of the nation's banks raise their prime

interest rate to a new record high of 12.25 percent.

Aug. 29—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.4 percent in July.

Aug. 30—Gold reaches a record high on the London gold market of \$319.125 an ounce.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Middle East; Nicaragua*)

Aug. 3—On Israeli television, Vice President Walter Mondale says that American policy toward the Palestine Liberation Organization and toward Israel "remains unchanged."

Aug. 7—In response to a congressional resolution introduced by Representative Paul Findley (R., Ill.), Secretary of State Cyrus Vance agrees that Israel may have violated provisions of a 1952 military accord by using U.S.-built planes in the Israeli bombing of Lebanese targets on July 22.

Aug. 8—President Carter assures Israeli Ambassador Ephraim Evron that the U.S. stands by all its commitments to Israel.

Aug. 9—According to administration sources, in mid-July the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Navy and Air Force commands to move up to 3 miles offshore in territorial waters with specific instructions to test the 3-mile limit in the waters of Argentina, Burma and Libya, which have 12-mile limits. 22 countries including the U.S. accept a 3-mile limit; 76 others claim 12 nautical miles offshore and 14 claim territorial rights for 200 miles.

Aug. 14—The State Department acknowledges that U.S. delegate to the U.N. Andrew Young was reprimanded by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance today for holding an unauthorized meeting with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official Zehdi Labib Terzi at the New York home of the Kuwait delegate to the U.N., Abdalla Yaccoub Bishara, on July 26; Young previously denied that the meeting was arranged and the State Department backed his story.

Aug. 15—U.S. delegate to the U.N. Andrew Young resigns his post after his reprimand by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; he will remain in his post until a successor is appointed.

Aug. 20—President Carter's special Middle East envoy Robert Strauss returns to Washington, D.C., after meeting with Egyptian and Israeli leaders; he says that the results of his mission were "not good."

Head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Joseph Lowery meets with PLO representatives at the U.N. The leadership is unhappy about the resignation of Andrew Young.

Aug. 22—Leaders of the principal national black organizations meet in New York to discuss the resignation of Andrew Young and to air their grievances against Jewish organizations whom they hold partly responsible for Young's resignation.

Aug. 23—Leading Soviet dancer in the Bolshoi ballet Aleksandr Godunov defects in New York City; the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service grants him asylum for at least a year.

Aug. 24—U.N. delegate Andrew Young persuades the U.N. Security Council to postpone a vote on an Arab and third-world-sponsored resolution calling for "self-determination, national independence and sovereignty" for the Palestinians; Young is this month's president of the Council.

In Beijing, China, Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) concludes a 19-day visit to China by meeting with China's Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping; Jackson

says that China is unhappy about the U.S. delay in approving the U.S.-China trade treaty signed on July 7.

The State Department delays the take-off from Kennedy International Airport of a Soviet airliner bound for Moscow with Lyudmilla Vlasova, a Bolshoi ballerina and the wife of defected Soviet dancer Aleksandr Godunov, to make sure that the ballerina is leaving of her own free will.

Aug. 26—Vice President Walter Mondale meets with Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, China; the leaders call for strengthened ties between the U.S. and China to "bolster stability" in the world.

Aug. 27—Speaking for television in Beijing, China, Vice President Walter Mondale tells the Chinese people that a "strong and secure and modernizing China" is in the American interest and that the U.S. is prepared to extend \$2 billion in trade credits over a 5-year period through the Export-Import Bank.

After 3 days, the grounded Soviet airliner is allowed to leave Kennedy International Airport with Soviet ballerina Lyudmilla Vlasova on board; U.S. and Soviet negotiators met with the dancer in a mobile lounge. The American negotiators, led by deputy U.S. representative to the U.N. Donald McHenry, say that they are satisfied that the dancer is returning to Moscow of her own free will.

Aug. 28—In Beijing, Mondale announces that Chinese Communist party Chairman Hua Guofeng will visit President Carter in the United States this year and that the President will visit China.

Aug. 29—In Mexico City, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher meets with Mexican President José López Portillo and then with Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda to discuss U.S.-Mexican problems.

"Speaking with the full authority of the United States government" in the U.N. Security Council, Andrew Young says that the U.S. "demands" that Israel stop "pre-emptive airstrikes" in southern Lebanon and that the PLO halt guerrilla attacks against Israel and Israel's southern Lebanese allies. The U.S. asks the PLO and Israel to cooperate with U.N. peacekeeping forces in Lebanon to halt the warfare there.

Aug. 30—6 U.S. Senators, visiting in Moscow, say that Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin has assured them that the Soviet Union is committed to SALT II and will not improve or increase the number of its Backfire bombers.

Aug. 31—President Jimmy Carter names U.N. deputy delegate Donald F. McHenry as chief delegate to the U.N. to replace Andrew Young.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says that we have now been able "to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit," some 2,000 to 3,000 combat troops, on the island of Cuba. The U.S. expresses "concern" to the Soviet Union.

Labor and Industry

Aug. 2—General Motors Corporation chairman Thomas A. Murphy says that he is opposed to any special U.S. financial help for the Chrysler Corporation; on July 31, Chrysler asked for up to \$1 billion in government aid.

Aug. 3—The Chrysler Corporation asks the United Automobile Workers union to agree to a 2-year freeze on wages and benefits; the union rejects the request.

Aug. 9—Treasury Secretary G. William Miller says that President Carter will propose some form of loan guarantee program of between \$500 million and \$700 million for

the Chrysler Corporation. The guarantees would follow the pattern of the New York City loan guarantee of 1975 and the guarantee to the Lockheed Corporation in 1971.

Aug. 16—The General Motors Corporation reports that it has laid off a total of 28,000 workers; this brings the auto industry total to 77,500.

Legislation

Aug. 1—The House votes 263 to 159 for a standby gasoline rationing plan; since the House amended the bill it goes to House-Senate conference.

Aug. 3—Congress recesses until September.

Aug. 23—About 89 members of Congress are traveling abroad on official duty at government expense during the congressional recess.

Science and Space

Aug. 28—A report released today at a physics symposium at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in Batavia, Illinois, says that an international team of some 300 physicists, using the new nuclear accelerator in Hamburg, West Germany, this summer, have reported strong evidence of a new particle called a gluon, which acts to hold the nuclei of atoms together.

VATICAN

(See also *China*)

Aug. 29—The Vatican announces the itinerary for Pope John Paul II's visit to the U.S. in October. A scheduled stop in northern Ireland is cancelled because of the recent killings there.

VIETNAM

Aug. 5—The government confirms reports that Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly Hoang Van Hoan has defected to China.

Aug. 17—Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Nguyen Thach says the government has released about 90 percent of the political prisoners who were arrested for their role in the Saigon government; he says the prisoners who remain in jail are "criminals."

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

(See also *Intl. Commonwealth Conference; United Kingdom*)

Aug. 6—In Salisbury, Prime Minister Abel T. Muzorewa rejects the Commonwealth Conference's call for new elections in Rhodesia, but he says he welcomes the "positive elements of the plan."


Aug. 10—In Dar es Salaam, Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere says the Patriotic Alliance will agree to the new peace proposal on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and will compromise on the issue of the security forces during a transitional government.

Aug. 15—Prime Minister Muzorewa's government accepts the invitation to attend the conference in London on the conflict in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Aug. 19—In Dar es Salaam, the co-leaders of the Patriotic Front, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, agree to attend the British-sponsored peace conference. They do not agree to a cease-fire in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia during the conference.

Aug. 22—Prime Minister Muzorewa announces that former Prime Minister Ian Smith, Minister without Portfolio, will attend the London conference as part of the country's delegation.

Aug. 25—Prime Minister Muzorewa announces that sometime before the London conference, Zimbabwe will become the country's official name. ■



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